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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the extent to which New Zealand's select committee 
system strengthens the ability of Parliament to play an independent 
legislative role. After considering the literature on legislative - executive 
relations, the paper examines the significance of changes made to legislation 
by select committees. This is done by measuring the number of changes 
made to public bills during the 46th Parliament. This research replicates and 
extends early analyses undertaken by Palmer in 1979 and Skene in 1990. 
The quantitative analysis is supplemented by case studies of three bills 
considered by select committees in the 46th Parliament: the Employment 
Relations Bill, the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill (No 4) and Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Amendment Bill. 
Having established that New Zealand select committees do have a 
significant legislative impact, the paper considers two possible explanations 
for this: structural design and electoral system change. Factors constraining 
the influence of the committee system are also examined. The paper 
concludes that, while the institutional and procedural settings were 
favourable for a strong committee system, the end of single-party 
governments and the increased diversity in views represented in Parliament 
since electoral system change have greatly strengthened the committee 
system and, in tum, the independence of Parliament from the executive. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 15,185 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Literature on responsible government suggests that the era of 
effective parliaments has passed and that unicameral parliaments, especial
ly 
in systems with highly disciplined parties, 
1 play little role beyond that of an 
electoral college for the executive.
2 This is especially the case in two party 
systems where single party governments are the norm. Traditionally th
e 
pre-eminent role accorded to Parliament is to make laws.
3 However, many 
authors contend that Westminster parliaments no longer perform 
a 
significant legislative role.
4 According to the standard argument, executive 
dominance means that parliaments are no longer able to perform the
ir 
traditional roles. 
It has been suggested that despite having a unicameral Parliament 
coupled with a party system marked with high levels of internal legislativ
e 
cohesion, the New Zealand House of Representatives defies th
is 
'conventional wisdom'. According to some commentators it plays a
n 
important legislative role due to its system of select committee scrutiny 
of 
legislation. 5 This is shown by a pattern of significant changes being made 
to 
1 Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine "The Individual Parliamentary Member a
nd 
Institutional Change: The Changing Role of the New Zealand Member of P
arliament" 
(1999) 5 Journal of Legislative Studies 105, 110. 
2 Andrew Hill and Anthony Whichelow What's wrong with Parliament? (Pen
guin, 
Hannondsworth, 1964) 102; Dean Jaensch Getting Our Houses in Order (Pe
nguin 
Australia, Ringwood, Victoria, 1986); TF Lindsay Parliament.from the Pres
s Gallery 
(Macmillan, London, 1967); Lord Hailsham The Dilemma of Democracy (C
ollins, London, 
1978); Tom McRae A Parliament in Crisis: the Decline of Democracy in Ne
w Zealand 
(Sheildaig, Wellington, 1994); Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution
 in Crisis 
(Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992); Rodney Smith "Parliament" in Judith Brett, Jam
es A Gillespie 
and Murray Goot (eds) Developments in Australian Politics (Macmillan, Me
lbourne, 1994) 
106; Peter Wilenski "Can parliament cope?" in J. R. Nethercote (ed) Parliam
ent and 
Bureaucracy (Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1982). 
3 For example, Richard Mulgan "Parliament: Composition and Functions" in
 Raymond 
Miller New Zealand Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckla
nd, 1997); 
Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power (2 ed. Oxford University Press, Auckland
, 1987) 96; 
Gordon Stanley Reid and Martyn Forrest Australia's Commonwealth Parliam
ent 1901-
1988: Ten Perspectives (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1989). 
4 See note 2, above, and, for example, June Verrier "The future of parliamen
tary research 
services: to lead or to follow?" (1996) 11(1) Legislative Studies 36. Not al
l authors think 
this is necessarily a bad thing, for example Peter Duncan "The relevance of
 parliament: the 
executive view" (1996) 11(1) Legislative Studies 32. 
5 Geoffrey Skene New Zealand Parliamentary Committees: An Analysis for th
e Institute of 
Policy Studies (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1990). 
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legislation in the select committee process. Burrows and Joseph
6 
go as far 
as to describe New Zealand's committee system as "a crucial bastion of 
democracy in our legislative process". The Royal Commission into the 
Electoral System described select committees as "the best means, consistent 
with our constitutional tradition, of providing a parliamentary check on 
executive and administrative power".7 Cullen describes the committee 
system as the "shining light" of the parliamentary system. 8 Existing and 
former MPs taking part in the 1996 New Zealand Election Study candidate 
survey ranked select committee work significantly higher than speaking in 
the House.9 
This paper questions the extent to which the select committee system 
facilitates the New Zealand Parliament in playing a significant legislative 
role. After a discussion of the arguments regarding legislative-executive 
relations in Westminster systems in Part II, Part III examines some data on 
the quantum of amendments made at the select committee stage, followed 
by three case studies. Having established that the select committee system 
does make a difference, the paper turns to an examination of why this 
occurs. Part IV considers internal structural explanations while Part V 
examines the impact of electoral system change. 
II CAN PARLIAMENTS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
The defining feature of parliamentary government is that the 
political executive is drawn from, and is responsible to, the legislature. The 
political executive holds office so long as it has the support of a majority of 
members of the lower house. If they fail to maintain this support, they 
6 J F Burrows and Philip A Joseph "Parliamentary Law Making" (1990) NZLJ 306. 
7 Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (GP Print, Wellington, 1986) 20. 
8 
Michael Cullen "Courtiers of the Executive? The New Zealand Parliament's role in policy 
development" (1998) 12(2) Legislative Studies 52, 53. 
9 Marcus Ganley "Public Perceptions of the New Zealand Parliament" (2000) 14(2) 
Legislative Studies 68, 74. Select committee work was still listed below constituency work 
as Palmer (Constitution in Crisis, above, 113) suggested it would be. 
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cannot retain office.
10 The rise of disciplined political parties has meant 
that, in practice, the party ( or coalition of parties) that has a majority in the 
lower house of parliament forms the government. In his seminal work on 
the nature of the British constitution, Walter Bagehot
11 described the nearly 
complete fusion of legislative and executive power as the 'efficient secret' 
of the Westminster system. This very ability to form government suggests 
that the executive controls the legislature. He saw Cabinet as the buckle 
that fastened the legislative and executive branches; while the political 
executive is drawn from the legislature, its very formation suggests that the 
political executive controls the legislature. 
A Party discipline 
The ability of the political executive to dominate the legislature is 
influenced by the level of internal party cohesion. In the United Kingdom, 
which from an international perspective has fairly high levels of party 
discipline, MPs from both parties often defy the party whip.
12 In contrast 
New Zealand has extremely highly disciplined parties. The Labour party 
requires its elected representatives to pledge themselves to vote with their 
party. 13 The other parties make much of this, though in practice there have 
been very few cases of any MPs voting against their party. This has 
recently been strengthened by the enactment of the Electoral (Integrity) Act 
1999. The level of discipline is strongly related to the small size of the New 
1° For a summary of the conventions of parliamentary government as they apply in New 
Zealand see Kenneth Keith "On the Constitution of New Zealand: An in
troduction to the 
foundations of the current form of government" in Department of Prime 
Minister and 
Cabinet Cabinet Office Manual (Wellington, 2001) 3 [ subsequently "Cabine
t Office 
Manual"] . 
11 Walter Bagehot The English Constitution (London, Watts, [ 1867) 1964) 11 . 
12 See, for example, Robert J Jackson Rebels and Whips: Dissension, Discipline,
 and 
Cohesion in British Political Parties since 1945 (St Martin's Press, New Yo
rk, 1968); 
Philip Norton '"The Lady's Not for Turning' But What About the Rest o
f the Party? Mrs 
Thatcher and the Conservative Party 1979-89" (1990) 43(1) Parliamenta
ry Affairs 41.; 
Philip Norton and P Cowley "Rebels and rebellions: Conservative MPs i
n the 1992 
Parliament" (1999) British Journal of Politics & International Relations 8
4. To some 
degree Westminster's three-line whipping process does provide a safety 
valve for unrest by 
allowing members greater latitude on minor issues. 
13 As the Alliance party did when it was represented in Parliament. 
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Zealand Parliament and the comparatively large executives. As Stone14 has 
shown where a large political executive is drawn from a small pool of MPs 
the incentives for MPs to follow the party line is particularly strong. For 
example, in the recently announced ministry 27 out of 52 Labour MPs have 
been awarded an executive position. 15 Additionally, three MPs have been 
awarded the title Parliamentary Private Secretary to assist ministers from 
outside the executive. This means 30 of the 52 Labour MPs hold a position 
that requires loyalty to the leadership. 16 With the addition of the two whips, 
who are responsible for maintaining party discipline, the likelihood that the 
governing party will act as a single unit is high. 
Once Cabinet makes a decision, collective responsibility requires 
that all ministers17 support it. 18 This will almost always result in a majority 
in caucus regardless of backbench opinion. Once caucus has endorsed a 
decision, all government MPs are expected to support it in the House. 
When a majority government is in office, this means the legislature supports 
the decision. The opinions of other parties in Parliament are, by this logic, 
irrelevant. Together, collective responsibility and party discipline means 
majority Cabinet decisions are normally translated into unanimous party 
decisions. 19 
14 
Bruce Stone "Size and Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian Parliaments" (1998) 
33(1) Australian Journal of Political Science 37. See also Harry Evans "Constitutional 
safeguards, bicameralism, small jurisdictions and Tasmania" ( 1999) 13(2) Legislative 
Studies 1, 2. 
15 
Executive positions include both ministers and undersecretaries. 
16 
'Cabinet criticism' (16 August 2002) The Press Christchurch 6; "Jobs for the boys, and 
nearly everyone else too" (16 August 2002) New Zealand Herald Auckland 1. 
17 This applies regardless of whether the Minister is in Cabinet. 
18 Cabinet Office Manual, para 3.20 and 3.21. 
19 
Taken to its extreme executive dominance, in systems with highly disciplined parties, has 
been seen as leading to prime ministerial government. As chair of Cabinet the Prime 
Minister sets the agenda, calls on speakers and sums up the decisions or 'consensus' 
reached. This may result in 'decisions' of Cabinet not reflecting the views ofa majority of 
Cabinet ministers, though with careful use of these powers this may not be realised at the 
time. It would be extremely risky for any prime minister to adopt such an approach 
frequently. 
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B Unicameralism 
Executive dominance m New Zealand 1s strengthened by 
unicameralism. To Lijphart, whether legislatures are unicameral or 
bicameral is "the most important institutional variable on which they 
differ".20 The proponents of bicameralism suggest that in such systems 
there is a greater potential for parliaments to play an independent legislative 
role.21 This potential derives from the possibility that the party (or coalition 
of parties) that commands a majority in the lower house on confidence and 
supply is not guaranteed such a majority in the upper house. In such cases 
Cabinet loses its ability to use collective responsibility and party discipline 
to translate government decisions into legislative majorities. This in tum 
could result in greater scrutiny of the executive and greater legislative 
autonomy.22 
Other commentators are less convinced of the virtues of 
bicameralism, arguing that upper houses will be controlled either by the 
government, in which case they are likely to play a minor role, the 
opposition, in which case they may frustrate the will of a popularly 
elected government, or minor parties, who will receive disproportionate 
influence.23 According to Keith Jackson bicameralism can also become 
seen as a cure-all - it is a "simplistic solution to complex problems, 
and as such appeals to politicians as an easy policy to offer the 
electorate". 2
4 
20 Arend Lijphart "Foreword: 'Camera! Change' and Institutional Conserva
tism" in 
Lawrence D. Longley and David M . Olson (eds) Two Into One: The Politics
 and Processes 
of National Legislative Camera/ Change (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorad
o, 1991) ix. 
21 Evans, above, 2. 
22 Electoral and Administrative Review Commission Queensland Legislative A
ssembly 
Electoral System Volume I - The Report (Brisbane, 1990) 95. 
23 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 281; Palmer, Constitutio
n in Crisis, 
above, 123. 
24 Keith Jackson "The Abolition of the New Zealand Upper House of Parliam
ent" in 
Lawrence D. Longley and David M . Olson (eds) Two Into One: The Politics
 and Processes 
of National Legislative Camera! Change (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorad
o, 1991) 72. 
11 
At least for its last 60 years the New Zealand Legislative Council 
was seen as largely ineffective. 25 For much of its history, the Australian 
Senate was maligned as a body that had failed to achieve the goals set for it 
by the founding fathers. 26 The Australian state upper houses were long 
viewed similarly.27 However, it has recently been shown28 that the 
Australian Senate play a crucial role in the legislative process. The Senate 
is now clearly regarded as "an autonomous legislative body".29 In the last 
two decades minor parties and independents have held the balance of power, 
placing the control of its agenda out of the hands of both the government 
and the opposition. According to Sharman, this is due to the Senate's power 
· · h 30 to ms1st on c ange. 
Since the introduction of proportional representation m 1949 the 
power of the Senate has increased significantly. The representation of 
minor parties and independents that flowed from this, paved the way for the 
next stage in the development of the Senate, the establishment in 1970 of a 
comprehensive committee system.31 Such committees play a crucial role in 
allowing the Senate to carry out its legislative functions .32 The emergence 
in 1977 of the Australian Democrats, as a party committed to the use of the 
25 Jackson, above; Keith Jackson The New Zealand Legislative Council: a study of the 
establishment, failure and abolition of an upper house (University of Otago Press, 
Dunedin, 1972); Lord Cook ofThorndon "Unicameralism in New Zealand: Some Lessons" 
[1999] Canterbury Law Review 233 , 244. 
26 Campbell Sharman The Australian triple-£ Senate: lessons for Canadian Reform ? 
(Canada West Foundation, Calgary, 1989) 2. See for example Richard Lucy The 
Australian Form of Government: Models in Dispute (2 ed, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 
1993) 191. 
27 For example, Peter Coaldrake "Institutional 'Dry Rot"' in Working the System (St Lucia, 
Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1989) 57. 
28 Rodney Smith "Parliament", above; Campbell Sharman "The Senate and Good 
Government" in Kay Walsh (ed) The Senate and Good Government and Other Lectures in 
the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, 1998 (Papers on Parliament No. 33) (Department of 
the Senate, Canberra, 1999) 152, 157; John Uhr Deliberative democracy in Australia: the 
changing place of parliament (Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1998); John Uhr 
The Senate and proportional representation: public policy justifications of minority 
representation (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1999). 
29 Sharman The Australian triple-£ Senate, above, 6. 
30 Sharman "The Senate and Good Government", above, 157-8. 
31 Lucy above, 194; Alan J. Ward "Redesigning Westminster Legislatures in Australia" 
(Paper presented to BISA/PSA Political Science Group Workshop conference "The 
Dominion Concept: Inter-state and Domestic Politics in the British Empire" University of 
Warwick, July 1998). 
32 Ian Marsh The Senate, Policy-Making and Community Consultations (Senate Occasional 
Lecture, Department of the Senate, Canberra, 23 April 1999) 12. 
12 
balance of power in the Senate to pursue its goals, has further strengthened 
the power of the Senate. 
33 While the power to insist on change provides the 
Australian Senate with its ultimate sanction, it has only begun to wield 
effective power since the introduction of proportional representation and the 
emergence of a comprehensive system of parliamentary committees. 
34 
C Electoral system change 
So where does this leave New Zealand with its unicameral 
parliament and very high levels of legislative party cohesion? Until the 
electoral system was changed, the New Zealand system was seen as a 
perfect manifestation of a parliament dominated by Cabinet. According to 
Palmer and Palmer
35 this was due to the following factors: 
• A single party is elected to government; 
• Cabinet is drawn from the governing party's MPs; 
• The governing party acts as one unit; 
• The governing party dominates Parliament. 
In 1979, Geoffrey Palmer described the power of Cabinet in New 
Zealand as 'unbridled' and claimed New Zealand had "the fastest law 
making in the West". Thirteen years later he concluded that executive 
dominance meant the New Zealand Parliament played a very limited role in 
law-making; it was "a rubber stamp - it determined nothing".
36 
Each week MPs of the governing party met in caucus and in secret 
settled their policy. Once adopted, all members were obliged to vote 
for it in Parliament. Parliament became a rubber stamp - it 
determined nothing. . . . Cabinet in a small Parliament like New 
33 Sharman The Australian triple-£ Senate, above, 6. 
34 A similar case applies to the recent re-emergence of the upper hou es in New South 
Wales, South Australia and Western Australia all of which have moved to proportiona
l 
representation in the last 20 years. 
35 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power? (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997). 
36 Palmer Constitution in Crisis, above, I 05 - 106. 
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Zealand's came to dominate the caucus and therefore the Parliament 
to an extent still not possible in the United Kingdom. 
So marked was the lack of any checks and balances that Lijphart37 
saw New Zealand as the quintessential example of the majoritarian 
system.38 However, more recently New Zealand has seen a significant 
change in its institutional arrangements. In conjunction with the 1993 
election a referendum was held on the electoral system. This was the 
second part of a two-part referendum process. On 19 September 1992 New 
Zealanders had been asked first, if they wanted to change the electoral 
system, and second, if the system were to be changed which of four systems 
would they prefer. Over 55 per cent of electors voted in the referendum, 
with 85 per cent voting for a change in the system and 71 per cent choosing 
MMP of the four systems on offer. In the 1993 referendum, voters were 
given a straight choice between retaining plurality voting in single-member 
electorates39 and changing to MMP: 54 per cent of electors voted for 
change. 
Until the mid-1990s the Labour and National parties had a virtual 
monopoly on parliamentary representation. Since 1993 New Zealand has 
fluctuated between majority and minority governments (both coalition and 
single party). This has led to a break down in the fusion between legislative 
and executive power as governments find it more difficult to secure certain 
legislative support for Cabinet proposals. This is particularly the case for 
minority governments. While they may have undertakings on confidence 
and supply, this does not guarantee support on legislation. Even when 
majority coalition governments are formed, extensive consultation between 
37 
Arend Lijphart Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984). 
38 
Similarly Rod Hague and Martin Harrop Comparative Government and Politics - an 
Introduction (2 ed, Macmillan, London, 1987). 
39 
Popularly referred to as 'first-past-the-post'. This epithet is rather inaccurate as, unlike 
quota based single-member systems (such as 'preferential voting' in Australian lower house 
elections) where a 'post' is established and the first candidate to pass it is elected, there is 
no 'post' under plurality voting in single-member electorates. 
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the parties in the government are likely to be necessary.
40 
The impact of 
these changes is revisited in Part V. 
III IMPACT OF SELECT COMMITTEES 
A How to measure the impact of committees 
To assess whether the change that is occurnng following select 
committee consideration of legislation is indicative of legislative autonomy 
requires both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the changes made. 
Without being able to point to a significant quantum of change it is easy to 
dismiss any examples of major politically significant change as anomalies. 
At the same time, unless it can be shown that the changes committees make 
are politically significant rather than just technical they can just as easily be 
dismissed as playing simply a 'tidying' role in the legislative process. 
B Quantitative measures of legislative autonomy 
Palmer41 measured changes made to the 36 public bills, nine local 
bills, and one private bill referred to committees in 1977. Skene
42 
took a 
random sample of bills referred to committee in 1989 for comparison 
43 
and 
found that there was much greater amendment of the public bills in 1989 
than 12 years earlier. A survey, based on Skene's approach, was conducted 
for a sample of bills considered during 1997. 44 A summary of these findings 
is set out in table 1 below. 
40 Mai Chen "The new Parliament under MMP" (1997) 11(2) Legislative Studies 13. 
41 Palmer, Unbridled Power (1 ed), above, 23. 
42 Skene, above, 20-22. 
43 The sample was made up of 20 public bills, six local bills and two private bills. 
44 Marcus Ganley "Select committees and their role in keeping Parliament relevant" (2002) 
16(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 121 , 124. 
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1977 1989 1997 
Number of public bills examined 36 20 47 
Total changes made at select committee stage 978 830 2008 
Average number of changes per bill 27 41.5 43 
Table 1: changes to bills at select committee stage, 1977, 1989 and 1997. 
The change between 1977 and 1989 is perhaps understated as the 36 
bills considered in 1977 were referred to committee at the volition of the 
minister in charge. As such it was likely that the ministers in charge of 
these bills were relatively more receptive to changes than would have been 
the case with other bill considered in that session. However, the similarity 
between the 1989 and 1997 figures is striking and could suggest that the 
change in electoral system has had little impact on the legislative role 
played by select committees. 
Another explanation might be the political climate of the time. In 
1997 New Zealand had a majority government. While it was a coalition, it 
can be argued that in effect the Fourth Labour Government was too and by 
1989 cracks were showing. 45 It may be that in 1997 the executive was in a 
comparatively strong position with regard to the legislature despite the 1996 
election being conducted under MMP.46 
Alternatively the explanation could lie in the nature of the data. 
While a similar number of changes may have been made, in 1989 ministers 
had much greater influence over committees and the changes made may 
have been largely at the instigation of the minister or the department 
sponsoring the bill. If the changes in 1997 were made largely as a result of 
the committee process, and not at ministerial suggestion, then even though 
the number has not changed, the nature of the changes would be 
dramatically different. It is difficult to quantitatively measure this. 
45 
See, for example, Simon Sheppard Broken circle: the decline and fall of the fourth 
Labour Government (PSL Press, Wellington, 1999). 
46 
Barker and Levine, above, 114, suggest this was the case. 
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The surveys have been repeated using public bills considered by, and 
reported back, from subject committees
47 during the 46th Parliament.
48 
Statutes Amendment Bills were excluded from the sample as Standing 
Orders provide that if any member objects during the committee of the 
whole House stage to a clause in such a bill standing part, the clause is 
struck out.49 Given this, such bills tell us little about the relative influence 
of committees. Also excluded are bills to which the rules on 'bills to 
confirm agreements' apply. Select committees, and indeed the House itself, 
are prohibited as a matter of parliamentary procedure, from amending such 
bills to the extent normally possible. 
50 As such the patterns of amendments 
for such bills would skew the results. Unlike Skene and Palmer, data for 
Local and Private bills has not been collected. As Skene found, due to the 
small numbers of such bills comparisons over time were difficult. Public 
bills also tend to be of more interest in terms of indicating legislative 
autonomy from the executive. 
In addition to the information recorded by Palmer and Skene, 
amendments have been separated into majority and unanimous changes. 
Data has also been collected on changes made at the committee of the whole 
House stage to amendments recommended by select committee. This 
allows an assessment to be made of what happens to amendments once they 
get back to the House. According to Barker and Levine although "select 
committees have become somewhat more assertive since the introduction of 
MMP, the willingness of ministers to overturn committee decisions in the 
House indicates that so far the nature of parliament is little changed".
51 The 
amount of change to committee changes that occurs in the Committee of the 
47 The Employment and Accident Legislation Committee has also been included. 
48 Some evolution was necessary. A small number of the bills considered had been 
reported from a select committee in the 45th Parliament and re-referred to select committee 
in the 46th. The convention adopted here was to count only the changes made in the 46th 
Parliament. 
49 Standing Order 298(2). 
50 Marcus Ganley "The Role of the New Zealand Parliament in the Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlement Process" (Paper Presented to Australasian Political Studies Association 
Conference, Parliament House, Brisbane, 24 September 200 I). 
51 Barker and Levine, above, 126. Unfortunately the evidence they rely on for this is the 
continued assertion of the long-established rule of parliamentary procedure relating to bills 
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whole House may also indicate that the changes committees are 
recommending are more than 'tidying' at governmental behest. 52 
Number of public bills examined 129 
Total changes made at select committee stage 7262 
(3691 unanimous/3571 majority) 
Average number of changes per bill 56 
th Table 2: Total changes to public bills m 46 Parliament. 
At an aggregate level the data, set out in Table 2, suggests that more 
changes are being made, with an increase from just over 40 changes per bill 
in 1989 and 1997 to 56 for the period of the 46th Parliament. This is in 
keeping with expectations given the minority status of the government 
during the 46th Parliament. 
Changes of whole Changes of whole Changes of part of 
clause per bill subclause per bill a subclause per bill 
1977 4.5 7.3 15.4 
1989 15.4 6.5 19.7 
461n Parliament 12.1 14.8 29.5 
·lb Table 3: Changes to public bills by type of change, 1977, 1989 and 46 
Parliament. 
These measures are very rough and attempting to draw conclusion 
from them is risky. It is possible that the number of clauses per bill has 
increased, explaining away any change. 53 Different drafting styles can also 
influence the number of amendments recorded. This problem is exemplified 
by a comparison of the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill54 and the 
Victims' Rights Bill. In both cases the committee concemed55 
recommended significant policy changes to the bills. In the case of the 
Victims' Rights Bill, rather than having a multitude of amendments made to 
to confirm agreements, see Ganley "The Role of the New Zealand Parliament in the Treaty 
of Waitangi Settlement Process", above. 
52 The government has other tools at its disposal to stymie bills it is unhappy with, such as 
the financial veto, where there is a financial impact or voting against the adoption of 
majority amendments at the second reading stage. It is interesting that these blunt 
instruments have been rarely used. 
53 Skene, above, 22 at note 23. 
54 Enacted as the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001. 
55 Both Bills were reported from the Justice and Electoral Committee. 
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the existing text, the original clauses were omitted and replaced. A total of 
56 amendments were made at select committee stage. In contrast the 
Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill saw 459 amendments made to the 
original wording. While the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill may 
have been the subject of more significant policy change, the eight-fold 
difference probably exaggerates the difference. Often changes may be more 
presentational than substantive. For example, with the Pardon for Soldiers 
of Great War Bill the committee moved the names of those to be pardoned 
from the schedules to the body of the bill, while with the Maori Television 
Service Bill, much detail was transferred from the bill proper to the 
schedules. These variables may explain the decline (slightly in absolute 
sense, but marked in relative sense) in changes to whole clauses per bill 
since 1989 shown in table 3. 
Just over half the changes recommended receive the unanimous 
support of the committee considering the bill. This may indicate 
committees are operating in a non-partisan manner. Alternatively, it may be 
the case that about half the changes recommended are merely technical and 
non-controversial. It is interesting to compare the differences between 
committees on this variable. Some committees almost never make majority 
recommendations, while others rarely reach unanimity. Figure 1 highlights 
these differences. It might be expected that committees that reach 
unanimous changes are likely to see fewer of their changes overturned in the 
House. There is some support for this with the highest rate of reversals 
occurring with legislation considered by the Justice and Electoral 
Committee. However, the small numbers make drawing conclusions 
dangerous. 
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The figures for changes at committee of the whole House level, set 
out in table 4, record those changes made that significantly impact on a 
change made by a select committee. With more than one out of every eight 
changes recommended by a select committee being overturned in the 
committee of the whole House there is evidence to suggest that select 
committees do not consider themselves constrained to recommending 
changes that are supported by the government. 
Average number of Average number of Average number of Average number of 
changes made to changes to changes to changes to 
select committee amendments to amendments to amendments to part 
changes whole clause whole sub-clause of sub-clause 
13.6 21.9 10.5 13.5 
Table 4: Average number of committee of the whole House changes to select 
committee changes by type of change. 
Unfortunately data for committee of the whole House changes to 
committee changes does not exist for the earlier studies. It would be 
interesting to compare the rates of change, as this may explain the relatively 
high number of changes observed in 1989. If there was a very low rate of 
reversal in committee of the whole House, this might suggest that the 
changes being made were mainly at the behest of the minister sponsoring 
the bill. 
C Qualitative measures 
While these measures will provide evidence of the extent to which 
bills are amended this does not allow any assessment to be made of the 
significance of the changes that are made. A large number of amendments 
may show nothing more than poor drafting. Iles claims that "the knowledge 
that the select committees can ' tidy up ' bills may encourage the government 
to introduce bills in a rough form, even against the advice of Parliamentary 
Counsel".56 Beyond this, to be able to show that politically significant 
change is taking place requires close study of a sample of bills. On the basis 
56 Walter Iles "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation" [ 1991] Statute Law Review 165, 178. 
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of such examination authors have found that committees are constantly 
making significant changes to legislation. 
Skene57 cites the example of the Children, Young Persons Bill 1986 
which had every clause rewritten at select committee. When it emerged two 
years later as the Children, Young Persons and their Families Bill it was 
almost twice the size of the original bill. Michael Cullen, reflecting 11 
years later on the bill which was introduced during his time as Minister of 
Social Welfare explains that it was during the hearing of evidence before the 
select committee that: 58 
it became clear that the fundamental model . . . on which the bill was 
based was both wrong and unacceptable to many. My two senior 
colleagues on the Select Committee advised me of that fact and the 
result was a fundamental recasting of the legislation on a totally 
different model. 
Another example from the era of the Fourth Labour Government 
was the Mental Health Bill, which spent two years at the Social Services 
Committee. 59 After considering 152 submissions the committee reported 
the bill back, with significant amendments, as the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Bill. Skene also cites the Maori 
Fisheries Bill, which was changed to such an extent that the committee 
considering it decided it need to issue an interim report outlining the 
proposed changes so that further public submissions could be received.60 
Iles notes the controversial State Sector Bill 1988 was 48 pages long 
when sent to the Government Administration Committee and 153 pages 
long when reported back.61 Michael Cullen also argues that it was the select 
committee considering the highly controversial Employment Contracts Act 
57 Skene, above, 20. 
58 Cullen, above, 54. 
59 Skene, above, 20. 
60 Skene, above, 20. 
61 Iles, above, 172. 
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in 1991 that successfully ensured the retention of a separate judicial system 
for industrial relations. He notes that: 62 
Obviously it is rare for total policy reversal to occur. But it would not 
be fair to suggest that the power of the select committees is limited to 
minor matters or that it is essentially negative. It is normally 
constructive and often significant. 
More controversially in the 45th Parliament the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee removed certain retrospective provisions from the 
Taxation (Accrual Rules and Other Remedial Matters) Bill 1998 against the 
will of the government. The Energy Efficiency Bill was a Member's bill 
initially vigorously opposed by the Minister of Energy. However, the 
Transport and Environment Committee,63 that had a government majority, 
recommended that it proceed with amendments.
64 
These examples indicate that significant change is occurring when select 
committees consider bills. Coupled with the evidence of a significant 
number of changes being made, this does suggest that select committees are 
having a significant impact. To test this further four case studies have been 
conducted of legislation considered by committees during the 46th 
Parliament. Case studies make it possible to assess: the significance of 
amendments, who is responsible for them, and how they are brought 
about.65 Case studies also allow Skene's hypothesis,66 that there are four 
variables that affect the likelihood of a committee changing a bill, to be 
assessed. The variables are: 
62 Cullen, above, 53. 
63 Following the 1999 review of Standing Orders this committee was separated into the 
Local Government and Environment and the Transport and Industrial Relations 
Committees. 
64 For a discussion of the attitude of departmental officials servicing the committee see: 
Jeanette Fitzsimons (16 Feb 2000) 582 NZPD 541-543. 
65 Skene, above, 27-29. 
66 Skene, above, 25-26. 
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• The existence of divisions within the governing parties on the policy in 
question. 
• The balance of influence with the government caucus. 
• The personalities involved in the process, including: the interest groups 
lobbyists, representatives of the key departments and agency involved, 
the minister in charge of the bill, the chairperson of the committee and 
the opposition MPs. The ranking opposition MP, who will often be the 
most experienced MP on the committee, can be a dominant actor in the 
process. 
• The level of public interest. The committee process opens the 
legislative process to direct public input. This provides valuable 
feedback to government on how their proposals are being perceived in 
the electorate. 
D Case Study One: Employment Relations Bill 1999 
Even with high priority (and highly political) government legislation 
there is evidence that committees can influence the final form of the 
legislation. A government will do its best to see such legislation emerge 
from the legislative process unchanged. However, there are usually political 
costs in doing this. Despite trying to minimise the changes to the 
Employment Relations Bill that occurred at the select committee stage, the 
government, following concerns raised during the hearings, proposed 
amendments to the bill to take account of these concerns. 
I Bill as introduced 
The Employment Relations Bill was arguably the most contentious 
piece of legislation considered in the 461h Parliament. In addition to 169 
hours of select committee time spent on the bill, it took 54 hours and 52 
minutes under urgency including Saturday and Monday sittings of the 
House to complete its progress through the House. 
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The legislation repealed the equally controversial Employment 
Contracts Act and replaced it with a regime that according to the Minister of 
Labour placed "a greater emphasis on allowing workers who want that 
protection to more easily engage with a union and to benefit from a 
collective agreement". 67 Furthermore the bill purported to "recognise the 
often unequal nature of employment relationships and attempt a re-
balancing to produce fairer outcomes for all". The National and ACT 
parties were strongly opposed to the legislation that they saw as "a huge step 
back for New Zealand"68 and an attack on business and employers.
69 New 
Zealand First reserved its position on the bill.
70 
2 Committee considering the bill 
Rather than referring the bill to one of the 13 subject select 
committees that normally consider bills,71 this bill was referred to a special 
committee established on 22 December 1999 to consider the Accident 
Insurance (Transitional Provisions) Bill. At the time the Opposition 
criticised its establishment on a number of grounds. They suggested it was 
an attempt to avoid sending it to a committee chaired by Harry Duynhoven 
72 
or one on which there were members of the Labour Maori caucus. 
73 
However, the criticism that was probably closest to the truth
74 was that the 
committee was established with a majority of members representing parties 
supporting the legislation, 75 unlike Transport and Industrial Relations, 
which was tied between the government and the opposition.
76 
67 Margaret Wilson "Employment Relations Bill: Productive relations in the workplace" (14 
March 2000) Press Release. 
68 Hon Richard Prebble (16 March 2000) 582 NZPD 1176. Similarly, Rt Hon Jenny 
Shipley (16 March 2000) 582 NZPD 1167. 
69 Belinda Vernon (16 March 2000) 582 NZPD 1183; ACT Minority report, Employment 
Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 39. 
70 Peter Brown (16 March 2000) 582 NZPD 1185. 
71 Such as the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee, whose terms of reference are: 
accident compensation, industrial relations, labour, occupational health and safety, transport 
and transport safety (Standing Order 190(13)). 
72 The then chairperson of the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee. 
73 See for example Hon Roger Sowry (22 December 1999) 581 NZPD 107-108. 
74 See Hon Tony Ryall (22 December 1999) 581 NZPD 109-111 . 
75 The Greens had indicated support for both the government's accident insurance 
legislation and the repeal of the Employment Contracts Act (Sue Bradford (16 March 2000) 
582 NZPD 1172-1174). The membership of the committee was Graham Kelly 
(Chairperson), Helen Duncan (Deputy Chairperson), Luamanuvao Winnie Laban, Mark 
Establishing ad hoe committees allows the government to ensure it 
has a majority and a chairperson it has faith in when committees are 
considering controversial legislation. This may allow it to reduce the 
impact of the select committee scrutiny of legislation. This method was 
used frequently in the 45th Parliament.77 However, the Accident Insurance 
(Transitional Provisions) Bill and Employment Relations Bill were the only 
bills sent to an ad hoe committee in the 461h Parliament. 
In keeping with the highly political nature of the legislation being 
considered, the committee operated in an unusually partisan manner. The 
minutes 78 reflect the committee often took issues to a vote, a practice not 
regularly seen on select committees, where it divided on party lines. A high 
profile example of this was the decision to refuse advice or even evidence 
from the Treasury. 79 How partisan the committee became can be seen from 
the specification of the majority in favour of progressing the bill in the first 
sentence of the commentary. This is an unusual detail to include in what is 
a standard sentence in bill commentaries, and was not in the draft prepared 
by committee staff.80 The ill feeling created on the committee also became 
a matter of debate in the House. 81 
Peck (Labour) , Willie Jackson (Alliance), Sue Bradford (Green), Peter Brown (New 
Zealand First) , Hon Max Bradford, Gerry Brownlee, Dr Hon Lockwood Smith (National) 
and Hon Richard Prebble (ACT) 
76 The membership of the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee was Harry 
Dunyhoven, Ross Robertson, Dianne Yates (Labour) , Willie Jackson (Alliance), Gerry 
Brownlee, Simon Powers, Roger Sowry (National), Penny Webster (ACT). 
77 The following bills were considered by ad hoe committees in the 45t11 Parliament: Dairy 
Industry Restructuring Bill, Apple and Pear Industry Restructuring Bill, Kiwifruit Industry 
Restructuring Bill, Local Government Amendment Bill (No. 6) (ARST Abolition bill), 
Accident Insurance Bill. In the 44t11 Parliament the Agricultural Compounds Bill, the 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Bill and the Racing Amendment Bill were 
likewise considered by ad hoe committees. 
78 Select committee minutes relating to an item of business are publicly accessible once the 
committee has reported to the House on that item of business: Standing Order 237(1 ). 
79 "Legislators hear no evil" (19 May 2000) The Dominion Wellington 8. 
80 This becomes evident from comparison with draft 2 of the commentary with commentary 
as reported. 
81 For example, Hon Max Bradford accused the committee chairperson of attempting to 
'gerrymander the select committee process ' (9 August 2000) 586 NZPD 4044. 
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3 Amendments made by select committee 
The committee recommended nearly 280 amendments to the bill. 
However, these were predominantly technical. 82 Perhaps the most 
significant change made was to the definition of 'employee' and position of 
contractors. As introduced, independent contractors could be deemed 
employees if they met a 'control and direction' test and an 'integration in 
the business' test. This provision drew significant criticism. 83 The amended 
test puts greater emphasis on 'matters that indicate the intention of the 
persons'. It also specifically excludes volunteers, Real Estate Agents and 
sharemilkers. The changes did not satisfy the opposition. The National 
minority report describes the basic notions as "fundamentally bad law".84 
Another controversial prov1s1on was that requmng employers to 
disclose sensitive information.85 The committee recommended changes to 
protect the confidentiality of sensitive information by referring such 
information to an "independent reviewer" appointed by mutual agreement. 86 
Other provisions that were changed as a result of submissions included the 
access provisions, so that it was clear that unions did not have the right of 
access to dwelling houses,87 amendments to more comprehensively cover 
employees (particularly cleaners) whose business was sold or the work they 
were doing was contracted out, 88 and provisions relating to fixed term 
contracts to add greater clarity and flexibility. 89 
82 John McSoriley Employment Relations Bill 2000 as reported from the Employment and 
Accident Insurance Legislation Committee Bills Digest No. 682 (Parliamentary Library, 
Wellington, 8 August 2000) 2. This was certainly the National party's view, the National 
Party Minority Report, Employment Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 34. 
83 See, for example, Craig Howie ''NZ Post joins employment bill criticism" (31 May 2000) 
The Dominion Wellington 16; Matthew Brockett "Bill 'threatens women's jobs"' ( 17 May 
2000) The Press Christchurch 6; Bruce Holloway "Committee hears two very different 
views of act" (16 May 2000) Waikato Times Hamilton 2. 
84 Employment Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 38 
85 See, for example, David McLaughlin "Utu: The Revenge of the Unions" (July 2000) 
North and South New Zealand 54. 
86 Employment Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 10. 
87 Employment Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 7. 
88 Employment Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 11-12. 
89 Employment Relations Bill 2000, 8-2 (the commentary) 13-14. 
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4 Genesis of changes 
The committee received 2,305 substantive submissions and 15,064 
form submissions and spent 133 hours hearing 391 oral submissions in 
Wellington, Auckland, Christchurch and Hamilton. It spent approximately 
36 hours in consideration. Officials from the Department of Labour were 
appointed as advisers to the committee90 as were Ken Douglas and Steve 
Marshall. 
The changes made did seem to reflect the major concerns raised in 
submissions. This is particularly true of the changes to the independent 
contractor provisions and those relating to union access rights. The latter 
was of particular concern to federated farmers who were worried that as 
farms are both workplaces and homes, the bill as originally drafted would 
have allowed union officials the right to enter farmhouses. This would not 
only raise privacy concerns but could expose farmers to liability for 
accidents.91 However, very few substantive changes were made, and those 
made did not go as far as many submissions had urged. 
92 
5 Amendments made by the committee of the whole House 
A number of amendments were made that refined amendments 
recommended by the select committee. These included further changes to 
the access provisions that could be seen as reversing the changes made by 
the select committee to mollify the concerns of business.
93 
Changes were 
also made on motion of the minister to the fixed-term provisions that 
address some of the concerns raised by submitters who were concerned the 
bill as drafted, and indeed as returned from select committee, was too 
restrictive in relation to fixed-term employment. 
90 In accordance with Standing Order 210 officials from the government department 
sponsoring a bill are normally appointed as 'advisors' to a committee considering a bill. 
91 For criticism ohhis provision as originally drafted see: "Fed Farmers says bill a disaster 
for rural sector" (19 May 2000) The South/and Times 9. 
92 Dene Mackensive "Trade unions consider ERB 'done and dusted"' (4 July 2000) Otago 
Daily Times Dunedin. 
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6 Assessment of committee's consideration of the bill 
In contrast to the positive picture painted of the role of select 
committees by authors such as Skene, Mulgan94 argues that whenever 
important political issues arise committees revert to partisan clashes. The 
example of the Employment Relations Bill supports this contention. The 
committee operated in a highly partisan manner and the amendments that 
were made clearly had the approval of the government. It became clear that 
ministers were involved in decision making outside the committee room95 
that was translated into committee decisions through party discipline. 
In this case, the role of the committee was largely confined to 
finding drafting errors and generally 'tidying-up' the legislation. However, 
the benefits that came from having a process for hearing public submissions 
should not be ignored. This process allowed concerns to be aired in a public 
forum and under constant media attention. Consequently significant 
political pressure came on the government to 'allow' changes to be made. 
E Case Study Two: Te Ture Whenua Maori/Maori Land Bill 1999 
1 Bill as introduced 
Te Ture Whenua Maori Amendment Bi1196 was introduced, under 
urgency, on the last sitting day of the Forty-Fifth Parliament97 by the then 
Minister of Maori Affairs, Hon Tau Henare and referred to the Maori 
Affairs Committee. The bill followed a major review of the Act, to which 
93 Interestingly, this amendment, moved by the Minister, was itself successfully amended 
on motion of the Greens' Sue Bradford. 
94 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1994) 
77. 
95 See, for example, Ian Llewellyn "ERB changes 'superficial' say opposition MPs" (19 
July 2000) The Independent 3; Graeme Peters "Employment Relations Bill secrecy doing a 
job on NZ" (22 July 2000) The Evening Post Wellington 9.; "Cullen breaks secrecy over 
employment Bill" (5 July 2000) The Evening Post Wellington 2; Howie, above, 16. 
96 Bill number 336-1. 
97 Tuesday 5 October 1999. The Hou e actually sat until Friday 8 October but this was one 
sitting day as the House was in urgency from Tuesday afternoon. 
29 
the Minister of Maori Affairs committed when the original Act was passed, 
98 and followed "extensive consultation"99. 
This bill proposed significant changes to the principal Act, 100 
including: 
• changes to the rules for the alienation of Maori freehold land and the 
confirmation of alienations; 
• providing a new power to the Court to order access to Maori land 
that is landlocked; 
• requiring consideration of an intended Judges' knowledge of te reo 
Maori, tikanga Maori, and the Treaty of Waitangi prior to their 
appointment to the bench; 
• increasing control by owners over the establishment and 
management of trusts and incorporations by reducing the Maori 
Land Court (MLC)' s discretion in relation to trusts and 
incorporations. 
Particularly significant were changes to section 30 of the principal 
Act to extend the MLC's power to advise or determine the most appropriate 
representatives of "a class or group of Maori" in proceedings or 
negotiations, consultations, allocation of funding, or other matters. The 
amendments originally proposed would allow the court to identify the most 
appropriate representatives for specific, as well as general, purposes 101 and 
to place an expiry date on advice supplied or a determination made 
identifying appropriate representatives of a group of Maori. 102 
98 TeTure WhenuaMaori/Maori Land Bill 1999, 336-1 (explanatory note) I. 
99 Te Ture Whenua Maori/Maori Land Bill 1999 1. 
100 The bill as introduced (336-1) had 62 clauses. 
101 Clause 10(1): new section 30(JA). 
102 Clause 10(2): new sections 30(3A) and 30(3B). 
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2 Committee considering the bill 
Of the nine members on the Maori Affairs Committee, four 103 were 
from the Labour party. Together with Willie Jackson from the Alliance this 
saw the government parties holding a clear majority on the committee. 
However, all committee amendments were unanimous. This suggests that 
the partisan balance was not a crucial factor in the committee's deliberations 
and that there was room for contribution from opposition members. The 
opposition MPs 104 brought considerable expertise to the committee's 
consideration, with three of the four members at the time having served as 
ministers. The senior opposition member on the committee, Hon Doug 
Kidd, in addition to bringing considerable parliamentary experience, 105 had 
been the Minister of Maori Affairs at the time the original bill was passed. 
His National colleague, Hon Georgina Te Heuheu, as well as having been 
an Associate Minister for Treaty Negotiations served on the Waitangi 
Tribunal before entering Parliament. 
3 Amendments made by select committee 
The bill emerged from select committee significantly changed. A 
number of proposals to introduce Maori definitions into the Act were 
removed, as was the proposed extension of the class of beneficiaries under a 
will to include whangai. Provisions relating to wahi tapu were overhauled 
and the multiple provisions relating to alienation by different types of 
owners were clarified and, to a large extent, consolidated. The original 
proposals to amend section 30 were completely overhauled and replaced 
with wider-reaching changes. According to the committee, the amendments 
it proposed to section 30 represent "a progressive shift away from the 
approach taken in the past by the Court in imposing decisions on parties, to 
a Court interested in facilitating the resolution of differences by the parties 
themselves or by mediation". 
103 John Tamihere, Dover Samuels, Joe Hawke and Mahara Okeroa. 
104 Hon Doug Kidd, Hon Georgina Te Heuheu and Wayne Mapp from National, and Hon 
Richard Prebble from ACT. 
105 He had been an MP for 24 years including six as a Cabinet minister and three as 
Speaker. 
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4 Genesis of changes 
Most of the 38 submissions received by the Maori Affairs 
Committee were concerned solely or predominantly with the provisions 
relating to access to landlocked land. Submissions from Maori supported 
the provisions while they were opposed by those from local authorities 
(costs), the Department of Conservation ( conservation land being used for 
access), and New Zealand Railways Corporation and Tranz Rail Limited 
(public safety issues). These resulted in changes to exclude national parks, 
public reserves and railway lines and require the MLC to have regard to 
issues of public safety raised by a rail service operator. 
The other major issue in the bill was that of representation. Nine 
submissions touched on this topic. 106 The most substantial submission on 
section 30 came from the MLC bench, which recommended that the existing 
adjudicative system be replaced with a system based on mediation. 107 
While it is not unheard of for judges to appear before select committees to 
provide evidence on how proposed legislative changes might work in 
practice, it does raise questions about separation of powers and whether a 
'Court' should be promoting changes to legislation.108 
Also highly influential was a Law Commission advisory report 
prepared for Te Puni Kokiri (TPK).109 This paper highlighted a number of 
issues with section 30, which will be discussed below. Significantly the 
106 These were the submissions from Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, Te Runanganui o Te 
Pakakohi Trust Inc, Te Hunga Roia Maori o Aotearoa, the New Zealand Maori Council, 
Tama Nikora, Joe Rua, Rudland Law, Chris Webster, Te Whenua Motuhake o Whaingaroa 
and the Maori Land Court. 
107 
A similar point was made in the brief submission from the New Zealand Maori Council. 
Chief Judge Joe Williams and Deputy Chief Judge Wilson Isaacs appeared before the 
committee in private session on 14 September 2000 in support of the submission. 
108 
As the reaction to the role played by Court of Appeal judges in the Crimes (Criminal 
Appeals) Amendment Bill highlighted. See for example, Christine Langdon, "Tanczos 
defends judges over crimes bill brief mg" (13 June 2001) The Dominion Wellington 11; 
Matthew Palmer quoted in Brent Edwards "Judges accused of meddling" (12 June 2001) 
The Evening Post 1. 
109 
The advice was later published as a study paper: Law Commission Determining 
Representation Rights Under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993: An Advisory Report for Te 
Puni Kokiri - Study Paper 8 (Wellington, 2001) para 22. 
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Commission noted, "long term, we believe that a process-based solution 
may work better than a court-imposed solution". 110 
Some evidence of the independence of the committee from 
governmental direction can be drawn from the number of departmental 
reports produced for the committee. Where a committee is simply making 
changes for the purposes of the minister, it would be expected that the 
committee's changes followed very closely those proposed in the report 
from departmental advisers. However, where the committee has requested 
various refinements to the departmental advice, and the final report has 
come through numerous iterations, as happened in this case, it suggests the 
committee is showing a degree of independence. 
5 Amendments made by the committee of the whole House 
The select committee reported the bill back to the House on 30 
November 2000. The House considered the report on 22 March 2001. 
More than a year elapsed before the bill was considered in the committee of 
the whole House. When this finally occurred substantial amendments were 
made to the amendments proposed by the select committee. 111 Many of 
these addressed technical concerns with the amendments. 11 2 Other 
amendments to the process of mediation prohibit a judge who sits as the 
MLC on a case from being the mediator, 113 limit the ability of the Judge 
referring the matter to mediation to prescribe the mediation process 114 and 
remove a power for mediators to receive confidential information. 115 
Proposed section 30G, dealing with unsuccessful mediations, is also 
substantially redrafted. 
110 Law Commission, above, para 42. 
111 These amendments were set out in Supplementary Order Papers 124 and 273 in the 
name of Hon Parekura Horomia. The changes are now incorporated into the bill as 
reported from the committee of the whole House (336-3) and are discussed below. 
112 Changes of this nature were made to the following proposed sections: 30B(3)(b), 
30C(l), 30C(5)(a), 30D(l), 30D(2) and 30G(2). 
113 New subsection 30D(6) inserted. 
114 Proposed section 30E(l) struck out and replaced. 
115 Proposed section 30E(2) deleted. 
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The most significant change to occur in the Committee of the whole 
House related to the interaction between the committee's proposed changes 
and Treaty settlement negotiations. In July 2001 the Justice and Electoral 
Committee commented 116 that the Minister in Charge of Treaty ofWaitangi 
Negotiations believed the proposed amendments would allow the MLC to 
make determinations that are binding on the Crown and that this could 
override the processes adopted by the Office of Treaty Settlements. 
According to Simes, while this would not prevent the Crown from deciding 
to negotiate with different representatives, such a choice would be 
"transparent and open to political challenge". 117 The amendments adopted 
by the committee of the whole House remove the power to specify who is 
bound by an order. 118 Additionally, a new subsection was inserted to 
prevent orders binding the Crown in relation to Treaty settlement 
negotiations without Crown consent. 
6 Assessment of committee's consideration of the bill 
This case study shows that where legislation is not controversial in a 
partisan sense, a select committee can play a significant role in revising 
significant policy issues within the legislation. It also shows the importance 
of submissions from key interests. While some of the changes to section 30 
were altered at committee of the whole House, it is clear that the 
submissions from the MLC and the Law Commission had a significant 
impact on the changes made to the bill. 
An alternative explanation could be that the changes resulted from 
policy work undertaken by the government between the introduction of the 
bill in October 1999 and the reporting back of the bill at the end of 
November 2000. As a change of government had occurred, it would not 
have been surprising to observe a change in government policy. However, 
116 Justice and Electoral Committee "Report on the 2001 /02 Estimates Vote Treaty 
Negotiations" (20 July 2001) para 7 .1. 
11 7 Cheryl Y Simes "Deciding who should represent Maori" [2002] NZLJ 100, 101. 
118 Section 30H(a) as reported from the Maori Affairs Committee. Also removed is the 
power to specify that an order is advisory only: Section 30H(a) as reported from the Maori 
Affairs Committee. 
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there is little evidence of this. 119 In advice to the committee, TPK states that 
the committee directed TPK and the Parliamentary Counsel Office to draft 
amendments along the lines of the proposals by the MLC and the Law 
Commission. 120 
F Case Study Three: Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill 
1 Bill as introduced 
Like Te Ture Whenua Maori Amendment Bill, this bill was also 
introduced under urgency on the last sitting day of the 45th Parliament. The 
main objective of the bill was to provide for expeditious classification of 
substances as prohibited drugs rather than requiring amendments to be made 
to the Misuse of Drugs Act each time a new drug was identified that 
warranted prohibition. Additionally, the bill as introduced established a 
'presumption of possession to supply' threshold for ' extasy' and related 
drugs and provided a defence for travellers with controlled drugs that have 
been prescribed to treat their medical condition. 
2 Committee considering the bill 
The Health Committee had a government majority unless the Greens 
voted with the opposition. 121 More than any other committee in the 46th 
Parliament this was an expert committee. Of the eight members two were 
doctors, 122 one a former nurse and public health manager123 and two were 
11 9 An examination of the Te Puni Kokiri Post Election Briefing to Incoming Ministers, 
reveals only one cursory mention of section 30 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 : Te 
Puni Kokiri , "Post-Election Briefing to Incoming Ministers" (Wellington, 1999). 
120 Te Puni Kokiri , "Report to the Maori Affairs Select Committee on Te Ture Whenua 
Maori Amendment Bill 1999" (2 October 2000) 4. 
121 On one high profile occasion the government lost its majority due to a defection by the 
Alliance - on the vote to establish the inquiry into Dr Graeme Parry. The membership of 
the committee at the time was: three Labour (Judy Keall, Steve Chadwick and Mita 
Ririnui), three National (Wyatt Creech, Paul Hutchison and Lynda Scott) one Alliance 
(Phillida Bunk.le) and one Green (Sue Kedgley) . 
122 Drs Paul Hutchison, and Lynda Scott. 
123 Steve Chadwick. 
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well known public health campaigners. 124 The chairperson had been chair 
of the Social Services Committee (which was then responsible for health) 
during the Fourth Labour Government and a member of the Health 
Committee since. The senior opposition member was the Minister of Health 
at the time the bill was developed. 
3 Amendments made by select committee 
The committee made 12 changes to the bill, all unanimously. The 
original bill proposed that the schedules listing class A, B and C drugs be 
removed from the Act and placed in regulations. New drugs would become 
classified and existing controlled drugs reclassified by regulation rather than 
legislative amendment. However, the regulations would have to be 
approved by a resolution of the House. The Regulations Review Committee 
argued that this procedure violated the long-established principle that 
matters of policy and substance should be dealt with by Act of Parliament 
rather than regulations that should be confined to dealing with matters of 
technical detail necessary to implement policy. Under the original proposal 
regulations would effectively determine the magnitude of an offence 
committed under the Act. 
The committee saw a need to strike a balance between the desire for 
expeditious scheduling and the need for appropriate parliamentary 
oversight. To achieve this they recommended that the schedules remain in 
the principal Act but provision be made for them to be amended by Order in 
Council. 125 Provisions were also made to ensure that both the Regulations 
Review and Health Committees would have an opportunity to scrutinise the 
Orders in Council. 126 
124 Phillida Bunkle and Sue Kedgley. 
125 This was not without precedent, see, for example, section 11 of the Tariff Act 1988 and 
section 80 of the Customs Act 1996. 
126 The Regulations Review Committee would retain the power to draw attention to the 
regulation under Standing Order 382 (2). The Health Committee 's role flowed from 
following Sessional Order adopted by the House on the committee's recommendation: 
I) Any Notice of Motion to approve an Order in Council made under 
section 4( I) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 197 5 stands referred to the 
Health Committee for examination. 
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In addition to this procedural reform, the committee also felt that 
there was not enough rigour in the procedure for making the policy decision 
as to which class a particular drug should fall within. On these grounds they 
recommended that an expert advisory committee should be established. The 
committee was not satisfied with departmental advice that such a committee 
could be established by ministerial fiat and amended the legislation to 
require the establishment of the committee. Analysis of the advice received 
by the committee shows that this was not something the Ministry of Health 
supported. It places a significant restriction on the powers of the Minister of 
Health. 
4 Genesis of changes 
Clearly the major source of influence for the amendments relating to 
parliamentary procedure was the report of the Regulations Review 
Committee. However, this change also highlights the role played by 
parliamentary officials. Both the Clerk of the House and the legal adviser to 
the Regulations Review Committee appeared before the Health Committee 
to advise on this issue. Until this point the committee looked like following 
a different course. . 
According to the commentary the decision to establish the expert 
advisory committee owes much to the submission from the New Zealand 
Drug Foundation. The Foundation argued that a statutory committee is 
required to provide the Minister with stable and reliable advice on the 
classification of drugs. 
Like Te Ture Whenua Maori, this bill saw departmental advisers 
asked to provide various alternative recommendations and three 
2) The Health Committee must report to the House on any such Notice of 
Motion within 28 days of the Notice of Motion being lodged. 
3) No motion to approve an Order in Council made under section 4(1) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 can be moved until either the Health 
37 
departmental reports, before the committee was satisfied with the 
departmental recommendations. 
5 Assessment of committee's consideration of the bill 
The consideration of this bill by the Health Committee again 
highlights the policy development role that can be played by a select 
committee. Despite a government majority, this committee acted contrary 
to departmental advice. In part this can be attributed to the subject area 
expertise of the members that enabled them to contest departmental advice. 
This bill also shows how the select committee process can be used to ensure 
that the interests of parliament in ensuring scrutiny of executive policy 
making are protected from incremental erosion. The two committees 
involved provided forums for the parliamentary officials to provide 
alternative viewpoints to those put forward from the executive government's 
bureaucracy. 
G A significant amount of significant change 
While there are dangers in placing too much store in the data 
collected on the quantum of changes occurring at the select committee 
stage, they are indicative of a significant amount of change occurring. It is 
also probably safe to conclude that this is increasing. There is also evidence 
that the changes being made are more than just 'tidying'. If this were the 
case then it would be difficult to explain the number of changes made to 
committee amendments at the committee of the whole House stage. The 
case studies support this. While on highly partisan legislation such as the 
Employment Relations Bill, not much significant change occurs, on less 
partisan legislation committees do seem prepared to make major 
amendments that effect the policy of the bill, even in the face of opposition 
from officials representing the Minister. 
Committee has reported to the House on the Notice of Motion or 28 days 
have elapsed since the Notice of Motion was lodged, whichever is earlier. 
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IV STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE IMPACT OF THE 
COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
Both in terms of the number of amendments made to government 
legislation and the significance of the changes made, it appears that the New 
Zealand Parliament, via its committee system does have significant 
legislative impact. Commentators outside New Zealand have viewed the 
structure of New Zealand's system favourably. 127 This Part considers the 
argument that it is the structure of the committee system makes it 
comparatively influential. 
A A tradition of parliament committees 
Part of the reason parliamentary committees are so strong in New 
Zealand is their longevity. 128 As table 5 shows, New Zealand has long had a 
substantial committee system. This is not true elsewhere. 129 One of the 
problems faced by those promoting the introduction of a committee system in 
the Queensland Legislative Assembly was the lack of any experience with 
committees in that chamber. 130 The Australian House of Representatives did 
not have a substantial number of non-domestic committees until the 1960s 131 
nor the Senate until 1970s. 132 
127 Derek Hawes Power on the Backbenches?: The Growth of Select Committee Influence 
(SAUS Publications, London, 1993) 208; Stone, above, 37 and Ken Coghill "Scrutiny of 
Victorian bills" (1996) 10(2) Legislative Studies 23. 
128 Keith Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Wellington, Allen & Unwin, 1987), 116-
117; Elizabeth McLeay "Parliamentary Committees in New Zealand: A House continually 
reforming itself?" (2002) 16(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 121 , 124. 
129 Until quite recently some of the Australian State legislatures had only 'domestic' 
committees dealing with matters to do with the management of the House, library, printing, 
catering, for example. 
130 Wayne Goss "Parliamentary Committees in Queensland" (2002) 16(2) Australasian 
Parliamentary Review 73. 
131 See Malcom Aldons "The Grown of Parliamentary Committees of the House of 
Representatives and Joint Committees" (1991) 6(1) Legislative Studies 6, 7. 
132 Harry Evans Odgers' Australian Senate Practice (9 ed, AGPS for the Department of the 
Senate, Canberra, 1999) 262. 
The establishment of the current powerful system is "the product of a 
long evolutionary process beginning in the nineteenth century''. 133 Early 
committees were mainly domestic. New Zealand also had an early 
experience with subject select committees. Most were originally set up to 
undertake particular investigations and later became institutionalised. The 
quintessential example is the Native Affairs Committee first set up in 1854 to 
consider problems of vaccination. From 1871 onwards the committee was 
established on an annual basis. Other subject committees established before 
1900 related to lands, 134 agriculture and pastoral matters, public health, 
defence and education. 
Year Number of Total number Average number of Average number of 
committees of committee members per committee 
places committee per member 
1920 28 285 10.2 3.6 
1930 31 234 9.4 2.9 
1940 28 195 9.8 2.4 
1950 24 224 9.3 2.8 
1960 22 207 9.4 2.6 
1970 20 200 10.0 2.4 
1980 18 151 8.6 1.7 
1990 21 114 5.4 u:i 1.2 
2000 19 162 8.5 1.35 
Table 5 SIZe and membership of committees 1850-2000. Jj(> 
The committees were the focus of much parliamentary business. 
According to an MP speaking in 1964,137 before 1928 committees met on 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday mornings. 138 In the 1956-1957 
session, four percent of debating time in the House was spent debating such 
reports. This had declined slightly by the 1966-1967 session (to 3 .4 per cent) 
but by the 1976-1977 session it had fallen to less than one percent. 139 Today 
debates on non-legislative reports of select committees are rare. 
133 Skene, above, 4. 
134 'Lands' was the subject of 25 ad hoe committees established between 1854 and 1870. 
135 C d . . . 1 orrecte - error m ongma . 
136 Source: Skene, above, 7 (1920-1990) and 587 NZPD (non numbered facing page). 
137 Daniel Riddiford MP (1964) 338 NZPD 254-255 quoted in Jackson The Dilemma of 
Parliament 117. 
138 
Since the election of the First Labour Government in 1935 first Thursday mornings then 
Tuesday mornings were lost to caucus meetings. Standing Orders now require unanimous 
consent of the committee for a meeting on a Friday, making such meetings rare. 
139 
Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979), 47. 
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places 
However, as accounts by Lipson in 1948 and McRobie in 1972 
indicate even the most influential committee at the time they wrote was not 
particularly effective. Lipson 's examination of the Public Accounts 
Committee led him to conclude that while the system should allow rigorous 
parliamentary control of expenditure "as the system now operates in New 
Zealand, the work of the committee is absolutely inadequate". 140 He saw this 
as uncontroversial being "conceded on all sides by the officials and the 
parliamentarians with whom the writer has discussed the matter". 141 The 
Public Expenditure Committee later replaced the Public Accounts Committee. 
However, McRobie concluded that committee's investigations were largely 
"superficial and perfunctory".142 Jackson saw little chance for improvement 
asking, "What government in its right mind wants the Public Expenditure 
Committee to have teeth, if it can possibly avoid it?"143 
B Key features of the system 
The strengthening of the committee system initially took place 
gradually. Parliament has formally reviewed its processes on a dozen 
occasions since 1950. 144 Until 1968 the impact on the committee system can 
be characterised as mainly tinkering. From that point on a series of seemingly 
innocuous changes were made that cumulatively greatly strengthened the 
committee system. Finally, following the 1984 election, a major review of the 
Standing Orders was undertaken with a view to significantly increasing the 
influence of the committee system. The ensuing 1985 report of the Standing 
Orders Committee recommended many of the changes proposed by Palmer in 
Unbridled Power and was influenced by the 1979 reforms of the 
140 Leslie Lipson Th e politics of equality: New Zealand's adventures in democracy 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948), 324. 
141 Lipson, above, 324. 
142 AD McRobie, "The Public Expenditure Committee" (research essay completed in 
Political Science Department, University of Canterbury, 1972) 28, quoted in Keith Jackson 
New Zealand: politics of change (Reed Education, Wellington, 1973) 136-137. 
143 Jackson 1973 New Zealand: politics of change 138. 
144 Standing Orders Committees were appointed in 1950, 1962, 1967-68, 1972, 1974, 1979, 
1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2000. 
Commons. 145 The system as it is now configured has six key features that 
make it comparatively influential: 
• Legislation automatically stands referred to committee; 
• Public submissions are heard on bills as a matter of course; 
• Committees are not restricted to technical amendments; 
• Changes are drafted into the legislation as reported back; 
• The committees are subject specialists; and 
• The government is not guaranteed a majority on committees, as the 
overall membership is proportional. 
1 Automatic referral of legislation to select committees 
New Zealand is unique in the Westminster-world in that almost all 
legislation is scrutinised by committees, with legislation automatically 
standing referred to a committee. 146 This is markedly different from many 
other jurisdictions. In the Australian Senate, for example, committees only 
consider bills if a member successfully moves to refer them. 147 The Senate 
refers only around a third of government bills that it considers for committee 
scrutiny, as shown in table 6 below. 
Year 1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001-
97 98 99 2000 01 02 
Bills 184 218 167 185 148 153 
considered 
Bills referred 67 77 94 66 66 46 
to committees 
Table 6: Government bills referred to committees by the Australian Senate 
legislation 1996-2002.148 
145 Geoffrey Skene "Parliamentary Reform" in J Boston and M Holland The Fourth Labour 
Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987), 
76; Skene New Zealand Parliamentary Committees, above, 4. 
146 "Appropriation" and "Imprest Supply Bills" are not referred to select committees as 
such, however the contents of appropriation and imprest supply bills are scrutinised by the 
committees during their consideration of the budget estimates: David McGee 
Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, GP Print, Wellington, 1994) 262 contra 
McRae, above, 204. 
147 Evans Odgers' Australian Senate, above, 246. 
148 Department of the Senate Annual Report 2001-02 (Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 2002) Table 2. 
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Prior to 1979149 in New Zealand legislation was referred by 
government motion. This provided a major limitation to the effectiveness of 
select committees. In 1976, less than half (52 from 114) of the public bills 
considered that session were referred to committee. 150 Mitchell estimates 
that in the 1950s and 1960s between two-fifths and one-third of the total 
number of bills were referred to select committees. 151 Jackson notes 
Kelson's claim152 that in the eighteen years to 1964 only one Private 
Member's Bill had been referred to a select committee. This latter practice 
changed significantly in the 1970s. In the 1975 session, for example, nine of 
the fifteen Private Members' Bills introduced were sent to select 
committees. 153 
According to Jackson, the following considerations were taken into 
account leading to a "remarkably haphazard" pattern of referrals: 154 
• Parliamentary 'tit-for-tat': a government refusing to send a bill to 
committee because the opposition, when in government, refused to 
subject some other bill, whether related or not, to committee scrutiny. 
• The lack of a corresponding subject committee. This is despite the fact 
that the vast majority of bills that did receive scrutiny were sent to the 
Statutes Revision Committee rather than a subject committee. 155 
• The belief on the part of the minister concerned that "if he can get the 
department and the pressure groups to agree on a particular piece of 
legislation, there is no need for any further consideration of the matter". 156 
149 Skene "Parliamentary Reform", above, 76; Skene New Zealand Parliamentary 
Committees, above, 4. 
15° Keith Jackson "A political scientist looks at Parliament" in John Marshall (ed) The 
Reform of Parliament: contributions by Dr. Alan Robinson and papers presented in his 
memory concerning the New Zealand Parliament (Institute of Public Administration, 
Wellington, 1978) 95. 
151 Austin Mitchell Government By Party (Christchurch, Whitcombe & Tombs, 1966) 72. 
152 Robert N Kelson The private member of parliament and the formation of public policy: 
a New Zealand case study (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1964) 86. 
153 Jackson "A political scientist looks at Parliament" above, 95. 
154 Jackson "A political scientist looks at Parliament" above, 95-96. 
155 Marian L Logeman "Committee Structure and Parliamentary Function" in Stephen 
Levine (ed) New Zealand Politics: A Reader (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1975) 365,373 n 13. 
156 Kelson, above, 86. 
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To this list can probably be added: 
• Reluctance to subject a bill to scrutiny if it can be avoided; and 
• Reluctance to give the Opposition a forum to gather information and 
criticise the government. 
At this stage the powerlessness of the committees was still lamented. 
Jackson claimed that committees were "essentially 'tame' bodies generally 
reluctant to act in any way which might be construed as embarrassing the 
Government".157 He saw this as a result of the small size of the New Zealand 
Parliament158 and the very high levels of legislative party cohesion that 
marked both major parties. 
This reform was fundamental to the institutionalisation of a strong 
committee system. Any further strengthening of the system was contingent 
on establishing automatic referral of bills to select committee. As long as the 
government of the day retained an absolute discretion on whether to refer a 
bill to committee any further strengthening of the committees would have 
been, in all likelihood, counterproductive as it would discourage ministers 
from sending bills to committee. 
2 Public submissions as a matter of course 
When a bill is referred to a select committee public submissions are 
called for as a matter of course. Committees also hear oral submissions 
from almost anyone who wishes to be heard and will travel to facilitate oral 
submissions. 159 While committees in many jurisdictions hear public 
submissions, there is not the same expectation that submissions will be 
invited and heard as a matter of course. This public involvement is a key 
element in the process as it vests significant legitimacy in the committee's 
conclusions. The expectation is created that some weight will be given to 
157 
Jackson "A political scientist looks at Parliament" above, 1978, 98. 
158 
At the time Jackson was writing the New Zealand Parliament had 87 Members. 
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public submissions. Where there is significant public concern expressed 
during the hearings of evidence this makes it difficult for a government to 
press on with the legislation it sent to the committee without any 
modifications. When government legislation is introduced we can usually 
assume that considerable work has gone into its development. However, 
this work goes on behind closed doors. While there is an expectation that 
consultation will be undertaken, 160 there is a qualitative difference between 
consultation being undertaken by the proponents of legislation and making 
submissions to a multi-party committee made up of members with a range 
of views on the issues. 161 
Since 197 4 the hearing of submissions has been open to the public and 
the media. 162 This drew much greater attention to the work of select 
committees and drew more public submissions. 163 Currently Standing Orders 
require hearings of evidence to be in public unless the committee 
unanimously agrees otherwise. 164 Of course when the public (and even more 
so the media) are present the behaviour of members and the dynamics of the 
committee are quite different to when members meet berund closed doors. 165 
The partisan clashes observed by Mulgan are more likely to occur during 
hearings of evidence than when committees are in closed session. 
New Zealand's legislative process probably provides the greatest 
opportunity for public participation of any legislature. A recent OECD 
report 166 found that committees in all of the 28 national legislatures 
159 Recently infrastructure has been put in place to allow videoconferencing where travel is 
uneconomic. 
160 Indeed, the Legislation Advisory Committee highlights the importance of consultation 
with interested parties: Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on the Process and 
Content of Legislation (Wellington, 2001) 24-26 . 
161 See Derek Quigley "Select Committees and Multiparty Policy-making" (2000) The 
Parliamentarian 132, 133. 
162 Up to this point the admission of the press required a motion of the House. (Jackson "A 
political scientist looks at Parliament", above, 96). 
163 Jackson "A political scientist looks at Parliament", above, 96. 
164 Standing Orders 217 and 219. 
165 Marcus Ganley "Public Perceptions of the New Zealand Parliament" (2000) 14(2) 
Legislative Studies 68 [Republished in (2000) Parliament and Business Trust Information 
Bulletin (3)]. 
166 0 . . fi E . C . d D rgarusat1on or conorruc o-operation an evelopment Report on Parliamentary 
Procedures and Relations (PUMA/LEG(2000)2/REV1, 22 January 2001) 14. 
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participating in the survey, as well as the European Parliament, could 
conduct public hearings on legislation. However, New Zealand was singled 
out both for holding public hearings on almost all legislation and for 
committees striving to hear most submissions received. While the former is 
a key element of the process, the latter is perhaps more a function of the size 
of polity. 
The submission process strengthens the ability of government 
backbenchers to influence decisions within the government caucus. Parties 
discuss in caucus the way their members on a select committee should vote 
on legislation before any final votes are taken. However, the MPs that serve 
on the committee and have read the submissions, witnessed the public 
hearings and been briefed by the relevant departments will be better 
prepared than their colleagues to determine what the party line on the 
legislation should be. If government MPs believe that the minister in charge 
of the legislation has not properly addressed the issues that have been raised 
in the submissions, they are in a position to argue the matter in caucus. But 
for the committee process they might be unaware of such issues. 
3 Ambit of investigation 
Unlike the 'Scrutiny of Bills' committees of the Australian state 
parliaments, the New Zealand committees are not restricted to technical 
amendments. A committee can recommend any amendments that are within 
the scope of a bill. 167 This can include major changes that affect the policy 
of the bill. 168 The origin of this power lies in a seemingly innocuous change 
that was made, in the interests of efficiency, following the 1967-68 review of 
Standing Orders. Provision was made for local bills to be referred directly to 
the Local Bills Committee during a parliamentary recess. The committee 
considered the bills without them ever having gone before the House. 
167 The scope rule is discussed further in Part VI. 
168 
Depending on the nature of the bill and the nature of the changes, some policy changes 
may be outside the scope of the bill. 
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This development was built upon in 1972 by a reorganisation of the 
legislative process that saw select committees considering bills after their first 
reading. Traditionally the first reading of a bill is merely the statement of 
intent. It is only when the House agrees to the second reading of a bill that it 
indicates an acceptance of the bill in principle. Sending bills to select 
committee before the second reading has been seen as meaning that the 
committee is able to make policy changes to the bill as well as technical 
changes. Herman and Mendel 169 argue that sending bills directly to a 
committee is a fundamental element of an established committee system. Of 
the 56 parliaments they examined they found that in 21 Parliaments a bill is 
considered first in the House itself and that in the remaining countries it is 
considered first by a parliamentary committee. According to Jackson 170 while 
the 1972 change "represented a maintenance of the primacy of the House of 
Representatives in theory," in effect in New Zealand bills are considered for 
the first time by a select committee. The first reading debate serves a filtering 
rather than a deliberative purpose. 
In 1995 the Standing Orders Committee recommended that the first 
reading debate be done away and the first reading became a simple formality. 
Following this change the first debate on a bill took place at second reading. 
If a bill was agreed to at second reading then it went to a select committee. 
This should have seen committees lose their ability to make substantive 
amendments to bills as once the second reading is agreed to the House has 
agreed to policy of the bill and it should not open to a constituent body of the 
House to overturn this agreement. 171 Despite this committees continued to 
make both substantive and technical amendments to the bills referred to them 
and the change was reversed in 1999. 172 
169 Valentine Herman and Fram;:oise Mendel Parliaments of the World. A Reference 
Compendium (Macmillan Press for Inter-Parliamentary Union, London, 1976) 661. 
170 Jackson "A political scientist looks at Parliament", above, 96. 
171 Mcleay, above. 
172 Standing Orders Committee "Report on the review of Standing Orders" [1999) AJHR 
1.18A 23-24. 
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4 Process of amendment 
New Zealand is almost unique in the Westminster world in that 
committees recommend changes that are drafted into the bill as reported 
back to the House rather than simply reporting findings. On government 
bills the committee is automatically provided with assistance from the 
Parliamentary Counsel Office to draft these changes. 173 It is this redrafted 
bill, along with a commentary explaining the committee's 
recommendations, which is reported back to the House. This makes the 
recommendations much more compelling. In other jurisdictions committees 
may argue quite persuasively in a report that a bill should be amended in a 
certain way. However, this would still require a further step to be taken 
before the recommendation becomes a concrete proposal. Here the 
committee not only makes a case for a recommended change, it presents the 
House with a professionally drafted alternative. 
In addition to the advantage accrumg to drafted amendments, 
recommended changes that are made unanimously are also procedurally 
privileged. Standing Orders provide that the House adopts unanimous 
changes automatically if it agrees to the second reading of the bill. If the 
government ( or any alternative legislative majority) wishes to remove a 
committee's recommended amendments it must amend the bill again on the 
floor of the House. The only other alternative is to vote against the second 
reading of the bill. However, this option is rarely pursued, as it would see 
the bill discharged completely from the legislative agenda and Standing 
Orders prevent a bill that is the same in substance as a bill that has 
previously been considered by proposed in the same calendar year. 174 
173 
With private, local and members ' bills drafting assistance from the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office is not automatic. Committees can request the Attorney-General to make 
such assistance available, but this will not always occur as the Government will not always 
wish to make scarce and expensive resources available for non-government legislation. In 
these cases committees can seek drafting assistance from the Legislative Counsel Office, 
located within the Office of the Clerk. The Legislative Counsel Office was established 
following a recommendation of the Standing Orders Committee in 1995 (Standing Orders 
~?mmittee "Review of the Standing Orders" [1995] AJHR I 18A, 59). 
Standing Order 100. 
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Where amendments are made by a majority of members of the 
committee these need to be formally adopted by the House in a separate 
question that precedes the question on the second reading. This would 
allow the government to prevent the changes being incorporated into the bill 
if they could muster the numbers on the floor of the House. As such this 
can be seen as a protection for minority governments. 175 
5 Subject speciality 
The most significant reform for the committee system following the 
1985 report of the Standing Orders Committee was the establishment of 
subject select committees that are aligned with, and have oversight over, 
specific government departments. 176 Palmer and others saw such a system 
as offering substantial benefits for New Zealand. These were in addition to 
three other permanent select committees: the Business Committee, the 
Regulations Review Committee and the Privileges Committee. The latter was 
the only committee that existed prior to 1985 to remain intact. 177 The subject 
select committees were, at the time, "as powerful as any in the Westminster 
model". 178 They were assigned the following roles: 
• scrutiny of all legislation introduced within their subject area; 
• scrutiny of the financial performance of government departments within 
their subject area; 
• review of the estimates for relevant government departments; 
• consideration of all petitions relating to their subject area; and 
• the ability to initiate inquries within the bounds of their subject area. 
175 Mary Harris "Update on Parliament - How is Parliament Performing Under MMP?" 
(Paper presented to Institute for International Research, 2°d Annual Public Law Forum, 
Wellington, 25 March 2002), 9. 
176 Such committees are often referred to as 'departmental committees' (Gavin Drewry The 
New Select Committees: A Study of the 1979 Reforms (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985); 
Dermot J T Englefield (ed) The Commons Select Committees: Catalysts for Progress? 
(Longman, Harlow, London, 1984). 
177 Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power (2 ed, Oxford UP, Auckland, 1987) 134. 
178 Skene "Parliamentary Reform" 78. 
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Since 1999 this list as been extended to include consideration of 
multilateral treaties and major bilateral treaties of particular significance. 179 
The non-legislative roles of the committees are important in their 
own right. However, they also enhance the ability of committees to 
effectively scrutinise legislation by developing Members' subject area 
expertise. The impact of this is noted in the discussion of the Health 
Committee's consideration of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill #4, 
above. The ability to conduct inquiries on their own initiative also allows 
committees to develop their subject speciality in a way that would not be 
possible if, like in many other jurisdictions, committees need an instruction 
from the House to undertake an inquiry.180 
The advantages of subject specialisation are predicated fairly stable 
committee membership. A number of authors have noted the serious 
challenge to the advantages of subject specialisation that arise from 
substitution of members.181 
6 Proportional membership 
The next Part discusses the impact of electoral system change. 
However, as Barker and Levine argue the procedural changes made in the 
lead up to MMP have independently strengthened the legislative autonomy 
of the New Zealand Parliament. 182 Following the 1993 referendum on 
electoral system change a Standing Orders Committee was appointed to 
179 Standing Orders 384-387. 
180 Many of the higher profile select committee inquiries initiated recently would probably 
not have been initiated. Examples of high profile recent inquiries include inquiries into: 
Defence beyond 2000; Mental Health Effects of Cannabis; Fire Service Commission; the 
Inland Revenue Department; CARD and INCIS ; Closer Economic Relations; the Visit of 
the President of China; the Teaching of Reading, auditing and monitoring of 'Closing the 
Gaps ' programmes; student fees , loans, allowances and the overall resourcing of tertiary 
education; Climate change and local government; the health effects and legal status of 
Cannabis inquiry; the Crown Forestry Rental Trust. 
181 For example, Skene New Zealand Parliamentary Committees , above, 7, Palmer 
Constitution in Crisis, above, 115-116, McLeay, above 2000. This issue is returned to 
below. 
182 Barker and Levine, above, 117, who, in fact, argue that the procedural changes are more 
significant that the change in electoral system. 
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assess what changes would be needed to prepare New Zealand for MMP. 
Some two years later, following a consultation process and visits to the 
parliaments of Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Germany, the 
Committee reported back recommending a major overhaul of the ways in 
which Parliament operated. The major recommendation was the use of 
proportionality as the guiding principle for managing the House. Previously 
the Parliament was organised on the basis that there was a party of 
government and a party of opposition, with speaking time alternating across 
the House and membership of committees reflecting the majority and 
minority status of the two parties. This model was seen as inappropriate for a 
multi-party chamber, where some parties would not fall clearly into one camp 
or the other. For example, before United entered into coalition with the 
National party in 1996, they were not part of the government. They could 
hardly be seen as an opposition party, though. Not only did United support 
the government on confidence matters; it also supported much of National 's 
legislative program. 183 The Standing Orders now recognise proportionality 
between parties as the fundamental organising principle within the House. 
This principle applies to membership of select committees. Standing Orders 
require that "the overall membership of select committees must, so far as 
reasonably practicable, be proportional to party membership in the 
House". 184 The details of membership are determined by inter-party 
bargaining at the Business Committee, 185 which is required to make its 
decisions on the basis of unanimity or "near-unanimity". 186 The partisan 
composition of committees in the 461h Parliament is set out in Table 7 
below. 
183 Pauline Gardiner (19 December 1995) 552 NZPD 10798. 
184 Standing Order 187(2). 
185 The Business Committee is a special committee, chaired by the Speaker, which makes 
determinations about the business of the House. It is established under Standing Order 74. 
186 Standing Order 75. While it is not clear what that threshold is, it has been established 
that when the representative of a party with four MPs (in the 1993-1996, 1999 member 
Parliament) objected, there was "near-unanimity' ': Speakers' Rulings 1996, 11/4. 
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Partisan composition of committees N Committees 
Government Majority 1 Maori Affairs 
Tied 187 3 Commerce 
Government Administration 
Transport and Industrial Relations 
Green balance of power 2 Justice and Electoral 
Social Services 
New Zealand First balance of power or 2 Education and Science 
tied Law and Order 
Green balance of power or tied 2 Local Government and Environment 
Health 
Green or NZF balance of power 2 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Primary Production 
Green/NZF/United balance of power 1 Finance and Expenditure . . tn Table 7: the partisan composition of committees m the 46 Parliament . 
The position in the 4ih Parliament is even more complex, as table 8 
shows. The Government has a clear majority on the Government 
Administration Committee. On most committees support from one of the 
parties with whom the government has a support agreement would be 
sufficient for a government majority. However, on the Commerce and the 
Education and Science Committees support of one of the declared 
'opposition' parties is necessary for a government majority. 
Commerce 4 Labour, NZ First, 2 National, ACT 
Education and Science 4 Labour, 2 NZ First, ACT, 2 National 
Finance and Expenditure 5 Labour, United, Green, ACT, 2 NZ First, 2 
National 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 3 Labour, United, Green, NZ First, Progressive, 
2 National 
Government Administration 3 Labour, 2 National 
Health 4 Labour, United, Green, 2 NZ First, ACT, 2 
National 
Justice and Electoral 5 Labour, United, Green, ACT, NZ First, 
2 National 
Law and Order 4 Labour, United, 2 National, NZ First 
Local Government and Environment 5 Labour, United, Green, NZ First, ACT, 3 
National 
Maori Affairs 3 Labour, Green, NZ First, 2 National 
Primary Production ACT, 4 Labour, NZ First, Green, 2 National 
Social Services 4 Labour, United, Green, 2 National, ACT, NZ 
First 
Transport and Industrial Relations 4 Labour, Green, NZ First, ACT, 2 National .. In Table 8. the partisan composition of committees m the 46 Parliament. 
187 On these three committees all members were either from the government or from 
National and ACT and both sides had exactly the same numbers. In order to preserve 
proportionality, following the 1995 reforms to the Standing Orders, committee chairpersons 
lost their casting votes. 
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Unlike the German system, where committee chairpersons are 
appointed on a proportional basis, 188 apart from the Regulations Review 
Committee (always chaired by a senior opposition member as a matter of 
convention), there is no convention or understanding that chairpersonships 
will go to opposition members. However, at the start of the last three 
parliaments a debate on the issue has occurred. 189 In 1996, there was a 
lengthy debate in the House on the appointment of committees that had to 
be completed under urgency. This delayed the establishment of select 
· £ £ h 190 committees or our mont s. Much of the debate surrounded how 
chairpersons should be appointed and whether proportionality should be 
applied to these appointments. In 1999, tied votes resulted in an impasse in 
the election of chairpersons in three committees that had to be resolved in 
the House. 191 In the 46th Parliament, only one subject committee had a non-
coalition member as chairperson. 192 In the 4?1h Parliament this has 
increased to four. 193 
C The importance of New Zealand's structural arrangements 
New Zealand's strong history of parliamentary committees, coupled 
with the six key features of the modern system, have created a highly 
influential committee system. Skene's 1989 findings, and the examples cited 
188 See Alan Witcombe "The Berlin Report: Report on the committee system of the 
Bundestag under MMP and its protection of minority rights for parliamentary groups" 
(Report prepared in fulfilment of a Winston Churchill Memorial Trust Fellowship, August 
2002) Chapter 8. 
189 Ruth Berry "United front on select committee postings" ( 16 August 2002) The 
Dominion Post Wellington 2.; "Sharing the spoils of power" (5 August 2002) New Zealand 
Herald Auckland; Jonathan Milne "Select committee revamp pushed" (27 September 2002) 
The Dominion Post Wellington 4 . 
190 (4 March 1997) 558 NZPD 529. 
191 For a description of the impact of this on the operation of the Education and Science 
Committee, see: Liz Gordon "Radical Democracy on Committees in an MMP Parliament" 
(2002) 16(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 151 , 155. 
192 The Local Government and Environment Committee, which was chaired by Jeanette 
Fitzsimons. 
193 Jeanette Fitzsimons continues to chair the Local Government and Environment 
Committee. She is joined by United leader, Hon Peter Dunne, who chairs the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, New Zealand First's Hon Brian Donnelly, 
chairperson of the Education and Science Committee and National's Hon David Carter, 
Chairperson of the Primary Production Committee. 
by numerous authors suggest that, even before electoral system change, the 
committee system was more influential than would have been expected given 
New Zealand's unicameral parliament and high degree of party cohesion. 
However, electoral system change has dramatically changed the dynamics of 
parliamentary politics in New Zealand. While structure is important, the 
electoral system change has played a crucial role in the continued 
strengthening of the committee system. 
V THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHANGE 
The strengthening of the committee system that has followed from 
electoral system change is primarily due to the break down of the link 
between government and dominance of the legislature as the major parties 
have either been forced to enter coalitions with minor parties or govern with 
a minority in the legislature and form legislative coalitions as issues arise. 
According to much of the literature on the impact of electoral 
systems, this 1s a natural result of the adoption of proportional 
representation. Duverger, in his 'hypothesis' 194 argues that proportional 
representation favours multipartism. However, Bogdanor195 argues that this 
reverses the lines of causality and that electoral systems are consequences of 
party systems more often than causes. While Riker196 casts doubt on such 
criticisms, a number of New Zealand authors support Bogdanor. 197 The 
history of electoral competition in New Zealand supports this second 
conclusion. The extent to which the New Zealand party system had 
fractured prior to the first MMP election is considered in appendix 2. 
194 Maurice Duverger "The influence of electoral systems on political life" 3 International 
Social Science Bulletin 314, adopting Riker 's description ofDuverger's 'law' (William H 
Riker ''Duverger's Law Revisited" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds) Electoral 
Laws and their Political Consequences (Agathon, New York, 1986) 9. 
195 Vernon Bogdanor "Conclusion: electoral systems and party systems" in Vernon 
Bogdanor and David Butler Democracy and Elections (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1983) 265 . 
196 Riker, above, 27. 
197 Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Helena Catt, Jim Lamare, and Raymond Miller Towards 
Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional 
Representation (Auckland, Auckland University Press 1995) 195 . 
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It is interesting to note that in the last 10 years similar trends in 
support for major parties in Australia have seen periods of minority 
government in all six states, despite the use of a majoritarian electoral 
system. 198 While the introduction of MMP may not, of itself, have led to a 
break down in the two-party system, it clearly facilitated the meaningful 
parliamentary representation of minor parties. 199 Previously minor party 
representation was suppressed by both the mechanical effect of the previous 
electoral system and the psychological effect, where voters do not vote for 
their preferred party for fear of wasting their vote. 200 
The breakdown of the two-party parliamentary system has loosened 
the link between Cabinet decision-making and parliamentary action. Even if 
the change in electoral system has not "revitalised and rehabilitated" the New 
Zealand Parliament as Barker and Levine suggest, many New Zealanders 
were hoping it would when they voted for electoral system change, it has had 
a significant impact resulting in significant small party representation.201 
New Zealand seems to have developed into what is referred to in the party 
system literature as a 'competing bloc' system.202 The characteristic of such 
systems is two major parties are each supported by a number of minor parties. 
There is more explicit intra-bloc dissension now than there was intra-party 
dissension when the major parties shared parliament with only the odd lonely 
independent or Social Credit MP. While disagreement within the major 
parties, which were in effect coalitions, was previously seen as all but fatal to a 
party's electoral prospects, it is unremarkable that different parties will have 
198 See Jeremy Moon "Minority governments in the Australian states: from ersatz 
majoritarianism to minoritarianism" ( 199 5) 31 Australian Journal of Political Science 
(Special Issue, Consensus Policy Making) 142. Since Moon wrote there has been minority 
government in Queensland (1996-1998, 1998-2001) and Victoria (1999 - present) bringing 
his total from four to six. South Australia has also had minority government since 1997 
and while the 2002 election saw a change of government, the new government is also a 
minority. 
199 Peter Aimer "The Future of the Party System" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 186. 
200 Arend Lijphart Electoral systems and party systems: a study of twenty-seven 
democracies, 1945-1990 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) 71-72. 
201 Barker and Levine, above, 105. 
202 Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay and Nigel S Roberts New Zealand 
Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1996) 101 . 
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different views on issues. While this does not seem to extend to coalitions, 
even there the demands for unity are not as great as for single party-
governments. 
This intra-bloc dissension creates a more fluid legislative environment. 
In the 46th Parliament we saw the governing Labour party rely on ACT to 
support sending bills to select committee. They also relied on the National 
party to pass legislation implementing a treaty that was opposed by all the 
other parties. Similar events occurred in the House when National led a 
minority Government in 1998 and 1999. While on politically controversial 
issues we can expect a degree of 'bloc cohesiveness', on other issues this is not 
the case. 
Barker and Levine203 argue that "more important than a system of 
proportional representation" is the relative distribution of power in 
parliament, that is whether a government has a majority. A comparison of 
legislative autonomy in the 1993 to 1996 Parliament, the last elected under 
FPP, and during the National-New Zealand First government from 1996 to 
1998, the first elected under MMP, seems to support this. The Bolger 
Government from 1993 to 1996 was in a state of flux moving from bare 
majority to minority and back again. During this Parliament the government 
used its legislative majority with care. During the first coalition government 
the majority was used regularly to force measures through the House. It 
could also explain why committees were becoming more active despite 
Mulgan 's argument that on important issues they revert to partisan clashes. 
Any major changes made to important government legislation could be 
explained by the minority status of the government, not the committee 
system. 
Barker and Levine's argument becomes less convincing when the 
counterfactual is considered. As suggested earlier, electoral system change 
may have been as much a result of party system change as a driver of it. 
203 Barker and Levine, above, 114. 
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Without electoral system change, we may have seen a prolonged period of 
minority governments, as South Australia seems to be experiencing. On 
major political issues similar outcomes could be expected. However, on 
most issues the practical impact a handful of minor party members would 
have had in a chamber dominated by the major parties would have been far 
less than what it is currently. Rather than having significant minor party 
representation on most committees, the average committee would have been 
made up of 'government' and 'opposition' MPs. The current picture is quite 
different, as was shown in the discussion of proportional membership. The 
fluidity that we see on most issues would simply not occur. Also the minor 
parties would not have the institutional resources they currently have to be 
able to cover the full range of activities. 
As noted earlier, MMP is having a significant impact in select 
committees. The lack of government majorities and advent of non-
government chairpersons on subject committees has produced quite 
different dynamics in committees. Ministers can no longer always rely on 
chairpersons to shepherd government bills and other business through a 
committee. Scrutiny of executive activity is sharper and more inquiry 
activity is undertaken.204 
In fact it is in the use of this inquiry power that we are seeing the 
most significant impact of the breakdown of government dominance over 
committees that has followed electoral system change. For example, in the 
45th Parliament, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 
conducted an inquiry into Defence beyond 2000205 . This was very much an 
initiative of the chairperson, Derek Quigley, a non-government chairperson 
who sought to have a considerable influence in the formation of future 
defence policy.206 Such an inquiry might never have gone ahead in an 
environment of government chairpersons and government majorities on 
committees. A chairperson would have had to think carefully about his or 
204 Harris, above, 13 . 
205 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee "Defence beyond 2000" [1999] 1.4D. 
206 Quigley, above. 
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her prospects before promoting such an inquiry and in any event it might 
well have been voted down at the outset. In this particular inquiry, 
government members had to rely on incorporating a minority view in the 
committee's report to present their position.207 
A number of inquiries in the 46th Parliament showed that it was not 
just non-government chairpersons that were prepared to champion 
controversial inquiries. This may suggest that a greater independence is 
starting to become institutionalised among the committee chairpersons.208 
The lack of government majorities also saw inquiries pursued that may not 
have taken place where there was a clear government majority, such as the 
inquiries into the Inland Revenue Department and the INCIS computer 
system in the 45th Parliament and the inquiry into the health effects on 
women of treatments by Graham Parry in the 461h Parliament. 
VI CHALLENGES TO THE EFFECTWENESS OF THE SYSTEM 
While New Zealand's structurally powerful committee system209 has 
become even more powerful since the introduction of proportional 
representation, challenges to its effectiveness remain. Parliamentary 
procedures, while allowing much scope for committee independence still 
allow techniques that undermine the committee process. Most 
commentators on the committee system have also noted problems with 
resourcing for committees.2 10 This problem has become more acute since 
the move to MMP. 
207 Harris, above, 14. 
208 
Possible examples include inquiries into: the teaching of reading, auditing and 
monitoring of 'Closing the Gaps' programmes; student fees, loans, allowances and the 
overall resourcing of tertiary education; the Crown Forestry Rental Trust; and the Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission. 
209 p . 1 ' th . rev1ous y among e most potent among Commonwealth Parliaments ' (Chen, above, 
15). 
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A Procedural limitations 
1 The exemption for money bills 
There are a number of tactics the government can use to avoid 
committee scrutiny of its legislation. McRae211 was particularly concerned 
about the practice of using the exemption for money bills to avoid select 
committee scrutiny of legislation. McRae's criticism of the exemption 
largely ignores the fact that the major money bills, those providing for the 
armual estimates and supplementary estimates, are scrutinised by select 
committees as part of their financial scrutiny. So the lack of legislative 
scrutiny may appear worse than it is. However, a recent report comparing 
the New Zealand and German practices has again highlighted this point.2 12 
In practice the more concerning point raised by McRae was the 
'tacking' of unrelated matters to finance bills and then splitting the bill at 
committee of the whole stage.213 This allowed controversial matters to 
enjoy the exemption for money bills. Standing Orders now make it much 
more difficult for governments to introduce these omnibus finance bills.214 
However, with the current legislative backlog, there may be further 
developments in this area. 
2 Urgency 
The urgency provisions provide another means for the government 
to avoid sending bills to select committees. If the House accords urgency to 
a bill before it has reached the select committee stage, it will not be sent to a 
210 Palmer, Constitution in Crisis, above, 116 citing David Caygill "Functions and Powers 
of Parliamentary Committees: A New Zealand Perspective" (Paper delivered to a 
Conference in Brisbane, May 1992,on file Victoria University of Wellington) . 
211 McRae, above, 17-18. 
212 Witcombe, above, Chapter 9. 
213 McRae, above, chapters 7 and 8. 
214 Standing Orders 256-259; Standing Orders Committee "Review of the Standing Orders" 
[1995] AJHR I 18A, 49-51. 
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committee.215 This has become more difficult since 1993 with the demise of 
single-party, majority governments. However, the National-New Zealand 
First government, even though it held the barest majority in the House, 
regularly took urgency on controversial legislation.216 In the 46th Parliament 
the Green Party rarely supported urgency before bills had returned from 
select committee; only eight bills completely by-passed the committee 
system.217 The most controversial was the Local Government (Prohibition 
of Liquor in Public Places) Amendment Bill.218 
There have been notorious cases of governments abusing procedure 
to avoid committee scrutiny of legislation. The use of the omnibus financial 
bill method in 1990 and 1991 and the taking of urgency on the 'work-for-
the-dole' legislation in 1998 stand out.219 Despite this well over 90 per cent 
of all bills go to select committee. 220 This raises a crucial question, why do 
governments not use these procedures to force all controversial legislation 
through the House? Is it simply because they are less likely to have the 
numbers to do so, or is there so great an expectation that legislation will go 
before a committee and the public will have a chance to comment, that to 
bypass this stage raises questions of legitimacy? The answer is probably a 
combination of the two. With a strong public expectation that select 
committee scrutiny is part of legitimate law-making, it becomes hard for 
governments to obtain support from smaller parties to support bypassing the 
2 15 McGee, above, 262 . If a bill has not previously been before a select committee the 
committee of the whole House holds a wide-ranging debate on the title clause of the bill: 
(Speakers' Rulings 1867 to 1999, 90/1). 
2 16 This tactic was quite controversial; see, for example, Rod Donald "Unicameral 
parliaments do work!" (1999) 13(2) Legislative Studies 30; New Zealand Council of Trade 
Unions "Parliamentary shambles claims another victim" (8 July 1998) Press Release; Ian 
Llewellyn, "Why Bother With Standing Orders?" (19 June 1998) NewsRoom; Ron Marks 
''National Management Of House Chaotic" (24 September 1998) Press Release; "Labour 
whip says urgency a sick joke" (27 July 1998) Waikato Times Hamilton; Ian Llewellyn 
"Why Bother With Standing Orders?" (19 June 1998) NewsRoom. 
217 Local Government (Rodney District Council) Amendment 2000, Local Government 
(Validation of Reappointments) 2000, Customs and Excise Amendment Bill (2000/13) , 
Customs and Excise Amendment Bill (2002/02), Dairy Industry Amendment No.2 2000, 
Road User Charges Amendment 2002, Taxation (Tax Rate Increase) 1999. 
2 18 A Member's Bill in the name of Rt Hon Winston Peters, which passed through all stages 
on 18 December 2001. 
2 19 The very fact that governments have adopted these tactics to avoid committee scrutiny 
may indicate that the changes made by committees are significant. 
220 McGee, above, 262. 
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select committee process. Governments also know that doing so would 
have political costs. 
3 The problem of Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) 
Commentary on the decision of the Attorney-General to introduce a 
Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) at Committee of the whole House stage 
that would have amended the Electoral Amendment Bill (No 2) by inserting 
a provision described as 'reintroducing criminal defamation' highlights 
another problem. By introducing substantive amendments after a select 
committee has considered a bill, the government can avoid scrutiny of these 
provisions. In this case the provisions had actually been considered at select 
committee stage, and rejected. While the primary objection to the change 
was a substantive one, much of the media criticism focussed on the process. 
It was characterised as "sneaky",221 "arrogant",222 "distasteful", "sly" and 
''underhanded". 223 
Criticism of the use of SOPs is not new.224 Palmer225 notes the 
ability they offer for abuse and suggests that the strengthening of the 'scope' 
rule could help alleviate the problem. Although the word 'scope' is 
commonly used in parliamentary practice226 it does not appear in the 
Standing Orders of the legislatures of New Zealand, Australia, Canada or 
the United Kingdom.227 In New Zealand the rule is outlined in Standing 
Order 283(2) for select committees and Standing Order 295(2) for the 
Committee of the whole House. Both provisions read: 
221 "Offensive clause axed, but questions linger" (6 December 2001) The Evening Post 
Wellington. 
222 "The trouble with watchdogs that work to agendas" (28 November 2001) The Daily 
News New Plymouth 
223 "Making law by stealth" (22 November 2001) The Press Christchurch. 
224 J F Burrows and Philip A Joseph ''Parliamentary Law Making" (1990) NZLJ 306. 
225 Palmer, Constitution in Crisis, above, 121. 
226 L M Barlin (ed) House of Representatives Practice (3 rd Canberra, 1997) 378,380; 
Evans Odgers' Australian Senate, above, 262; Donald Limon and WR McKay (eds) 
Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (22 
ed, Butterworths, London, 1997) 520, 525-526. 
227 Tim Cooper "In Search of Scope" (2000) 15(1) Legislative Studies 33. 
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The committee may recommend amendments that are relevant to the 
subject-matter of the bill, are consistent with the principles and objects 
of the bill, and otherwise conform to Standing Orders and practices of 
the House. 
The principle is elaborated in Speaker's Ruling 91/6, which states, 
"[a] bill can be amended only in ways that are relevant to the text. It cannot 
be turned into something that it is not, and did not start out as". However, 
often the SOPs will introduce changes that are within the scope of the bill. 
The mischief that needs to be prevented is the introduction of changes that 
could not have been contemplated by submitters at the select committee 
stage. It is hard to see how such a Standing Order could be drafted. 
There is room for procedural reform of the provisions relating to 
SOPs. Currently if a minister wishes to make major changes to a bill while 
it is still before a select committee they can introduce an SOP and refer it to 
the committee considering the bill.228 The committee could then advertise 
for submissions on the SOP as well as the bill and ensure that it receives 
both committee scrutiny and public input. However, to do so requires a 
two-hour debate in the House. With pressure on government time in the 
House, such referrals are rare. Ministers work around this by writing to 
committees inviting them to consider their SOPs, or simply by promoting 
the changes in departmental advice to the committee. The problem with 
these approaches is that they do not facilitate public input. If Standing 
Orders were amended to facilitate the referral of SOPs to the relevant 
committees, this may encourage ministers to adopt this course of action. 
This would not prevent the use of SOPs to subvert the process where this 
was the intent. 
228 In the 46th Parliament, SOPs were referred to committees on a number of bills, for 
example, an SOP on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill was referred to Justice and 
Electoral Committee and an SOP on the Smokefree Environments (Enhanced Protection) 
Bill was referred to the Health Committee. 
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3 Six-month rule for select committee consideration of bills 
In the lead up to MMP it was realised that as governments may no 
longer have majorities on select committees a committee could indefinitely 
delay a government bill that it did not support.229 To avoid this Standing 
Orders were amended prior to the first MMP election to provide that bills 
must be finally reported from committees within six months unless the 
House orders otherwise or the Business Committee grants an extension.230 
If a final report is not made, the bill is discharged from the committee and 
set down for second reading in the House.231 On complex legislation this 
can operate as a significant constraint on committees as the minister in chare 
of the bill can hold out the prospect of objecting to an extension to force the 
committee to cut short its consideration. 
B Substitution of members 
As noted earlier, a number of authors have criticised the rate of 
substitution that occurs in select committees. According to Skene during 
the 1980 session committees met on 306 occasions and there were 485 
substitutions. He also cited a weekly substitution rate of 13 per cent for 
Public expenditure and ''up to a third" for Defence. The Business 
Committee investigated the issue of substitution in 1989. They found that 
for the 254 committee meetings between January and May 1989 there were 
303 b · · 232 su stitut10ns. Skene saw the substitutions as being "injurious to 
efficiency" and impeding specialisation and decision-making: "Decisions 
made by five people on evidence presented to ten were rightly to be 
regarded with suspicion by interest groups". As Palmer notes233 MPs are 
often asked by party whips to attend select committee meetings at short 
notice. This means they will have little understanding of what is being 
229 This is common in the United States. 
230 Extensions were granted for 20% of bills in the 46th Parliament. Hanis, above, 9. 
23 1 Standing Orders Committee "Review of the Standing Orders" [1995] AJHR I 18A, 38. 
232 Business Committee "Report on the Committee's Review of the Inquiry Function of the 
Subject Select Committees" (1989) [1987-1990] AJHR Vo! XVII 1.14B para 6.2. 
233 Palmer, Constitution in Crisis, above, 115. 
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discussed. He goes on to describe the rate of substitution as having reached 
"farcical proportions".234 He also notes that substitution undermines the 
credibility of the process for submitters, especially "[ c ]ompetent 
professional people". 235 
Substitution m itself does not always undermine subject 
specialisation. Sometimes it reflects the need to move expertise according 
to items of business.236 For example, in the 46th Parliament, Hon Georgina 
Te Heuheu was regularly substituted onto the Justice and Electoral 
Committee when it considered the Estimates for Vote Treaty Negotiations. 
Similarly, National Party broadcasting spokesperson, Katherine Rich, was 
regularly substituted onto the Maori Affairs Committee for its annual 
financial review of Te Mangai Paho. She also participated in that 
committee's consideration of the Maori Television Service Bill.2
37 
With the increased size of parliament smce the change in the 
electoral system it could be expected that the rate of substitution might have 
declined with more members to be spread across the committees. However, 
new challenges have arisen. Smaller parties have struggled to cover all the 
meetings they wish to attend, while the size of committees has grown to 
accommodate the desire of parties to be represented on most committees. 
For example to achieve proportionality and allow parties representation on 
the committees they chose the Health Committee now has 11 members and 
Finance and Expenditure has 12. Currently a large executive means there is 
considerable substitution on the government side as Labour backbenchers 
cover absent ministerial colleagues.238 Most parties see flexibility in 
committee membership as being crucial to avoid 'losing the numbers' when 
234 Palmer, Constitution in Crisis, above, 115. 
235 Palmer, Constitution in Crisis , above, 116 similar! y at 115. 
236 Palmer Constitution in Crisis , above, 115. 
237 Subject speciality is also enhanced when committees have experienced staff who can 
assist them in their consideration. This topic is discussed further below. 
238 While Cabinet Ministers, the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker do not sit on subject 
committees, all Ministers outside Cabinet currently serve on a committee. Of the 120 
members, 102 who served on committees in the 46th Parliament. This was an average of 
1.59 committees per member. The Minister in charge of a bill may take part in the 
proceedings of a committee while it is considering their bill, but cannot vote. This seldom 
occurs. 
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their MPs are unavailable. This has seen the Standing Orders revised to 
facilitate the substitution of members.239 Conversely, while substitution 
rates have remained high tht larger size of committees has meant that even 
with a high rate of substitution it is easier to maintain a 'core' of permanent 
members at any committee meeting. 
C Resourcing and effectiveness 
Despite being comparatively more influential, the New Zealand 
committee system 1s lightly resourced compared to comparable 
jurisdictions. This is especially so in terms of staff resources. 
The tables below show the comparative staff resourcing for a typical 
committee secretariat in the Australian Senate and the New Zealand House 
of Representatives. 
Title 
Committee Secretary 
Principal Research Officer 
Senior Research Officer 
Research Officer 
Executive Assistant 
Total allocated to staff salaries 
Table 9: Australian Senate. L .. V 
Title 
Clerk of Committee 
Parliamenta Officer Select Committees 
Parliamentary Officer (Committee Support) 
One between two committees 
Total allocated to staff salaries 
Table 10: New Zealand House of Representatives. 
Salary AUD 
$72,819 - $80,983 
$59,946 - $64,766 
$48,267 - $54,LOl 
$39,095 - $42,448 
$35,077 - $37,859 
$255,204 - $280,157 
Sal NZD 
$42,126 - $54,516 
$34,901 - $45,166 
$27,370 - $35,420 
239 See Standing Orders Committee "Review of the Standing Orders" [1995] AJHR I 18A, 
34. The change is reflected in the contrast between the wording of current Standing Order 
188 and Standing Order 344 from the 1992 Standing Orders. 
240 Department of the Senate Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2001 (Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2001) Table 3. 
241 The primary report writer for a committee, one Parliamentary Officer (Select 
Committees) is typically assigned per committee but some are shared between two 
committees. 
242 No attempt has been made to control for different market dynamics or living costs. 
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The Deputy Clerk of the House recently noted that the growth in 
select committee inquiry activity has created greater demand for services for 
select committees. She also notes that greater committee independence 
brings into question the continued reliance on departments as the principal 
source of advice on bills. Given these developments, she suggests that even 
though "the first MMP Parliament saw more resources for select 
committees, further resources may yet be required to support adequately the 
level of activity that is developing".243 
The 1995 report of the Standing Orders Committee states that 
committee staff should be able to provide the "first-line analytical, research 
and advisory needs of committees"244 as an independent and permanent 
resource for select committees. In its report on the 2000/01 Estimates for 
Vote Office of the Clerk the Government Administration Committee noted 
that with the introduction of MMP have come greater demands on 
committee staff both in terms of heavier workloads and the complexity of 
much committee business. The Government Administration Committee 
also drew the attention of the House to the problem of turnover in the select 
committee office.245 The report notes an acknowledgement from the Clerk 
of the House that staff turnover in the select committee office "is higher 
than he would like it to be" and "that ideally he would like a committee to 
have the services of the same secretariat staff for the duration of a 
Parliament". 
Since the Clerk's comments to the Government Administration 
Committee the position has worsened. Turnover for professional staff 
servicing committees runs at over 33 percent per annum. Of the 13 subject 
select committees established under Standing Order 190 only three had the 
same Clerk of Committee for the entire 46th Parliament. The average Clerk 
243 Harris, above, 14. 
244 
Standing Orders Committee "Review of the Standing Orders" [1995] AJHR I 18A, 45-
46. 
245 
Government Administration Committee "Report on the 2000/01 Estimates for Vote 
Office of the Clerk" [2000] 2. 
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of Committee has spent leu than two years in that role and the report 
writing staff average less than one year servicing committees. 
The result of continuing high levels of turnover and lower 
experience levels of staff servicing select committees is a drop in the quality 
of services to committees. This is especially the case as most staff 
members ' subject area experience is limited to that learnt ' on the job' . A 
survey of MPs conducted by the Office of the Clerk in May 200 I showed a 
significant drop in satisfaction with the services offered by committee staff. 
This can be seen in figure 2, below.
246 
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Figure 2: Member satisfaction with select committee services J 999 and 
2001 compared. 
RATING 
63 23 
76 36 
Areas in which members ' satisfaction levels dropped most notably were in 
the quality of reports and of procedural advice. Both are functions where 
experience is particularly important. The Appropriations Review 
Committee reflects an alternative viewpoint, appointed under the 
Parliamentary Service Act 2000, in its recently released report on funding 
for Parliament that describes the level of turnover in the Select Committee 
Office as "healthy".247 
246 The results of the survey became part of the proceedings of the landing Orders 
Committee' s review of services to select committees and became public ly available at the 
end o f the 46'h Parliament. 
247 Appropriati ons Review Commitlce Resourcing Parliament: Report of the Review 
Co111mi11ee on the First Triennial Review of the Parliamenta,:v Appropriations (Wellington. 
2002) 46. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
New Zealand's select committees do have considerable legislative 
influence. Not only do they play a tidying role that inevitably comes with 
close scrutiny of bills; they also bring about important changes to 
legislation. ln addition to direct changes made to the draft bill that the 
committee reports back to the House, governments are prompted to draft 
their own changes in response to issues arising from select committee 
hearings of evidence. Through their inquiries, committees also bring 
pressure on governments to initiate legislative change. 
The recent change in the electoral system has seen the major parties 
lose their monopoly on parliamentary representation. This has made the 
formation of single party majority governments more difficult. With a 
single party being unable to control parliament the dynamics of the 
relationship between the political executive and the legislature has changed 
significantly. In the new environment it is expected that the legislature will 
have greater influence on the shape of legislation. This does not explain the 
evidence of significant changes being made to legislation by committees 
before 1993. The evidence of change before I 993 does not indicate whether 
the changes were being made as a result of the committee process or at the 
behest of the minister. There is now growing evidence that not only are a 
large number of changes being made, these are being made independently of 
ministerial direction. 
The fact that the New Zealand ' s select committee process does result in 
significant changes to legislation, even during periods of single party 
majority government, suggests the conventional wisdom regarding the 
legislative capacity of unicameral parliaments is unduly pessimistic. The 
lesson other Parliaments can learn from New Zealand is that while a 
powerful committee system might not alleviate all the perils of executive 
dominance, it can go a long way towards enhancing the strength of a 
Parliament to act as an effective legislature. 
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When this is coupled with an electoral system that facilitates 
multipartism, the ability of Parliament to operate as an effective legislature 
is enhanced significantly. However, there is room for development. The 
question of proportional allocation of select committee chairpersonships 
will continue to arise, as will the concept of applying proportionality more 
comprehensively and more strictly to all parliamentary procedures and 
appointments.248 Reform of the processes relating to Supplementary Order 
Papers is also needed. Beyond these procedural reforms there is a need for 
fostering greater public awareness of the process to facilitate interested 
parties taking advantage of the public submission process. There is also a 
need to enhance parliamentary resourcing to enable the legislature to 
effectively perform its functions. 
248 See Alan Witcombe "Germany and New Zealand: A comparison ofMMP committee 
systems" (December 2002) Public Sector Magazine New Zealand (forthcoming). 
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APPENDIX 1 -PUBLIC BILLS CONSIDERED BY, AND REPORTED 
BACK FROM, SELECT COMMITTEES IN THE 46TH PARLIAMENT. 
!Amendments to !Amendments to !Amendments to 
!Commerce !whole clause twhole sub-clause loart of sub-clause 
Shop Trading Hours Act Repeal 
!Electronic Transactions IM-5 IM-4 IM-4 
tTelecommunications IM-33 CWH-1 IM-47 CWH-11 IM-17 CWH-5 
Commerce (Clearance Validation) IM-1 
tTrade Marks IM-25 IM-40 IM-58 
tTelevisions New Zealand IM-4 IM-6 IM-6 
!Business Law Reform IM-26 IM-2 CWH-2 IM-1 CWH-1 
Sale of Liquor Amendment (No. 3) IM-1 IM-7 IM-14 
!Economic Development U-3 U-6 IM-1 
!Commerce Amendment IM-6 IM-2 U-1 
rrakeovers Code IM-2 IM-3 
!Electricity Amendment IM-17 
Shop Trading Hours Abolition of 
!Restrictions -
!Charter Professional Engineers -
Education and Science 
!Education Amendment M-5 U-4 IM-22 U-9 IM-11 
Annrenticeshio Training M-3 IM-3 IM-8 
M-40 U-14 
Education Amendment (No 2) CWH-14 IM-6 U-1 CWH-5 IM-18 CWH-10 
Tertiary Education Reform-2 M-34 IM-61 IM-37 
Industry Training Levies 
Employment and Accident Insurance 
Le2islation 
!Employment Relations (Validation ofUnior 
!Registration & Other Matters) Amendment 
IEmolovment Relations 2000 IM-60 IM-81 IM-49 U-88 
!Accident Insurance (Transitional 
!Provisions) IM-7 CWH-1 IM-15 CWH-2 IM-26 CWH-1 
!Finance and Expenditure 
!Medicines (Restricted Biotechnical 
!Procedures) IM-1 CWH-1 CWH-2 
!Hazardous Substances & New Organisms IM-5 IM-5 CWH-3 IM-7 
!Public Trust U-12 CWH-3 U-9 CWH-2 U-35 CWH-1 
!New Zealand Superannuation U-11 U-13 U-36 
rraxation (Annual Rates of Income Tax O 1-
02) - I-
tTaxation (Taxpayer Assessment & U-36 CWH-5 
IMiscellaneous Provisions) IM-1 U-17 U-62 CWH-3 
tTrustee Companies Amendment U-1 U-4 
Government Superannuation Fund 
!Amendment U-17 CWH-1 U-30 U-289 
!Public Audit U-4 U-12 CWH-1 U-57 CWH-3 
tTaxation (Annual Rates of Income Tax 00-
lol) 
rraxation (FBT, SSCWT & Remedial 
!Matters) U-11 U-25 U-87 CWH-10 
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!Amendments to !Amendments to !Amendments to 
!Finance and Expenditure (continued) twhole clause twhole sub-clause tpart of sub-clause 
traxation (GST & Miscellaneous 
!Provisions) U-16 CWH-1 U-53 U-140 
traxation (Beneficiary Income of Minors, 
Service-Related Payments & Remedial 
!Matters) U-20 U-25 CWH-1 U-44 CWH-1 
!Construction Contracts U-22 U-35 U-165 
rraxation (Relief Refunds & Miscellaneous 
!Provisions) U-14 U-46 U-136 
Securities Markets & Institutions IM-13 IM-59 IM-153 
rraxpayers Charter -
tForeie:n Affairs, Defence and Trade 
[Pardon for Soldiers of Great War U-11 
rrerrorism (Bombings and Financing) IM-73 CWH-8 IM-7 CWH-1 IM-23 CWH-22 
!Customs and Excise Amendment No 4 IM-1 U-4M-14 U-5M-l 
tf ransnational Organised Crime U-13 U-28 U-54 
!New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Extension 
!Government Administration 
Parliamentary Service U-2 U-15 
Gaming Law Reform IM-8 IM-3 IM-3 
Casino Control Amendment (separated from 
Parning Law Reform by select committee) U-6 U-3 U-13 
[Fire Service Amendment -
barning and Lotteries Amendment 
!Archives Culture and Heritage Reform - -
!Casino Control (Moratorium Extension 
!Amendment) -
!Crimes (Criminal Anneals) Amendment U-11 CWH-5 U-5 
!Civil Defence Emergency Management U-3 U-13 U-68 
!Recreation and Sport U-1 U-3 U-3 
State Sector Amendment 
:Citizenship Amendment No3 
!Responsible Gambling 
!Racing U-2 U-31 U-31 
IWhistleblowers Protection - -
!Films, Videos and Publications 
!Classifications (Prohibition of Child 
!Pornography) Amendment 
!Casino Control (Poll Demand) Amendment -
!Cigarettes and Fire Safetv ... 
!Dog Control (Hearing Dogs) Amendment - -
IBealth 
!Misuse of Drugs Amendment No.4 U-12 
[Alcohol Advisory Council Amendment IM-13 U-1 IM-6 U-1 CWH-1 IM-4 CWH-2 
!New Zealand Public Health & Disabilitv IM-26 CWH-5 IM-140 CWH-19 IM-49 CWH-2 
!Child Mentality Review Board ~ 
~ustice and Electoral 
!Electoral (Integrity) ~ 
IDefacto Relations (Property) 
Le11:al Services U-74 U-44 U-42 
!Referenda Postal Voting U-1 U-3 
!Matrimonial Property Amendment (& SOP) IM-86 M-34 IM-339 CWH-7 
Local Elections (Single Transferable Vote) 
!Local Electoral IM-14 U-27 M-8 U-38 IM-8 U-38 
IM-2 U-53 
!Victims Rights & SOP tWH-5 M-1 CWH-21 CWH-35 
[M-1 U-29 CWH-
!Electoral Amendment No.2 1 U-11 CWH-1 [M-6 U-10 CWH-7 
tourt Fees Waiver IM-2 M-3 
Sentencing & Parole Reform [M-52 CWH-6 M-228 CWH-42 IM-246 CWH-51 
IHuman Rights Amendment IM-8 M-35 CWH-1 M-66 CWH-5 
[Law and Order 
trown Organisations (Criminal Liability) U-1 U-4 U-1 
trimes Amendment (No.6) & 
Supplementary Order Paper No.85 U-33 U-2 U-25 
trimes (Bribery of Foreign Officials) 
!Amendment U-4 U-3 U-1 
IHabeas Corpus 
trimes Amendment 
!Undercover Agents Exemption 
trimes (Publications) - .... -
triminal Investigation (Blood Samples -
!Burglary Suspects) Amendment - -
!Degrees of Murder -
IArms Amendment (No.2) 
[Police Amendment (No.2) 
rrruth in Sentencing -
[Local Government and Environment 
Resource Management Amendment M-57 U-5 IM-101 !M-101 
!Forests (West Coast Accord) M-5 M-6 
[-lauraki Gulf Marine Park Amendment - U-2 U-1 
!Local Government (Elected Member 
!Remuneration & Trade Enterprises) 
!Amendments M-1 U-4 U-4 
Hazardous Substances & New Organisms 
k'\rnendment(No. 2) M-1 U-7 CWH-1 U-9 CWH-1 U-1 CWH-3 
M-2 U-28 CWH-
Local Government (Rating) 7 U-54 CWH-11 U-6 CWH-22 
Wild Life (Penalties) U-7 CWH-1 
Maori Affairs 
Maori Purposes U-11 -
Te Ture Whenua Maori U-15 CWH-2 U-9 CWH-10 U-20 CWH-14 
Maori Television Service IM-57 !M-23 IM-153 
[Primary Production 
!Animal Products Amendments U-21 U-11 U-42 
OC,and Transfer & Cadastral Survey U-15 U-58 CWH-7 U-19 
!Resource Management (Aquaculture 
!Moratorium) Amendment M-12 IM-10 U-11 
IBiosecurity Amendment U-11 U-5 
!Dairy Industry Amendment U-1 U-1 
!Fisheries Amendment M-35 
Fisheries (Remedial Issues) Amendment U-13 U-7 U-1 
Apple & Pear Industry Restructuring Act U-4 
Dairy Industry Restructuring U-41 U-61 U-66 
Foreign Fishing Crew Wages & 
Repatriation Bond U-5 ,- M-1 
Social Services 
Commissioner for Children U-3 U- 13 U-27 
Social Workers Registration IM- 7 M-24 IM- 60 
Parental Leave & Employment Protection 
Paid Parental Leave) Amendment U-4 U-8 U-13 
Social Security (Working Towards 
!Employment) Amendment IM-2 M-6 M-62 
K::hild Support Amendment U-1 U-1 U-5 
M-8 
Social Security Amendment CWH-1 CWH-4 M-5 CWH-3 
!Housing Corporation Amendment U-6 CWH-1 U-25 CWH-1 U-37 CWH-1 
tHousing Restructuring (Income-Related 
!Rents) Amendment M-22 M-2 CWH-1 IM-19 CWH-6 
!Children, Young Persons, & Their Families 
Amendment (No.3) U-4 U-1 U-4 
Social Security Amendment No.3 (formerly 
Social Security (Residence of Spouses) 
Amendment) - - IM-1 
Student Loan Scheme Amendment (No.6) U-2 ,-
Student Loan Scheme Amendment M-6 CWH-1 M-1 CWH-3 
Tattoo (Parental Consent) 
rrransport and Industrial Relations 
IAiroort Authorities Amendment (No.2) -
!Minimum Wages Amendment 
K::AA2 IM-1 U-23 U-6 U-42 
[Land Transport (Road Safety) Enforcement 
IA.mendment U-1 U-1 U-7 
K:;AA U-5 CWH-2 IM-2 U-2 U-17 CWH-3 
!Injury Prevention Rehabilitation & M-45 U-464 
Compensation IM-101 CWH-6 IM-60 CWH-30 CWH-55 
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APPENDIX 2-A 'DEALIGNED' PARTY SYSTEM? 
New Zealand has long had more than two important electoral 
parties.249 Figure 3 traces the vote of minor parties in New Zealand from 
1938 onwards. The beginnings of multipartism are in 1954 when the Social 
Credit Political League entered the political equation.
250 Since the 
emergence of the Values party in 1972, New Zealand has seldom met 
Blonde! 's criteria for being a pure two party system and since in 1993 it has 
been in Blondel's "genuine multi-party systems"25 1 category.
252 
All Minor Parties • "3rd Party" 
o L--~llii=ll=s;;;;IIIE... _________________ _ 
1946 1951 1957 1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1938 
Figure 3 Performance of Minor Parties, 1938-1996 
The result of the last election under the old electoral system provides 
further evidence to suggest that the two-party system had begun to break 
down before the change to MMP, and that the ability of the major parties to 
assume the ability to form majority governments was no longer guaranteed. 
Political scientists have begun to suggest that the changes in voting patterns 
249 Raymond Miller '"From Plurality to Proportionality: Some Early Observations on the 
Impact of Electoral Reform on the Party System in ew Zealand" (Paper Presented to 
Canadian Political Science Association Conference, Brock University, t Catherine·s Ontario, 
2-4 June 1996). 
250 Raymond Miller "The Democratic Party·· in I !yam Gold (ed) ew Zealand Politics in 
Perspective (2 cd, Longman Paul , Auckland, 1989). 
251 Jean Blonde! An introduction to comparative government (London. Wcidcnfcld & 
Nicolson, 1969) 184. 
252 Peter Aimer "The Future of the Party System" in Raymond Miller (cd) 'ew Zealand 
Politics in Transition (Oxford University Press. Auckland, 1997) 190. Sec also Rein 
Taagcpcra and Matthew Soberg Shugart Seats and I ates: The Effects and Determinants of 
Electoral Systems (Yale Univcrsit) Press. New I laven, 1989) 37; Rein Taagepcra and Bernard 
Grofinan "Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the EITcctive umber of Parties in Plurality 
and PR Systems - Parties Minus Issues Equals One" ( 1985) 13 European Journal of Political 
Research 341: Rein Taagepera and Martin oberg hugart '·Predicting the umber or Parties: 
A Quantitative Model of Duvergcr's Mechanical EITect'' ( 1993) 87 American Political Science 
Review 455: and Miki Caul. Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grof man "Determining the 
Number or Parties in Stable Democracies: Social I leterogeneity and Electoral Institutions" 
Paper presented to the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. 
Los Angeles, Cali fomia, March 19-21 , 1998. 
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in New Zealand represent more than short term volatility, and that what we 
are seeing is the end of stable voting patterns, 'the dealignment' of the New 
Zealand party system.253 According to Vowles and others, electoral system 
change was driven by "continuous demographic, economic, social and 
political developments". 254 Other manifestations of this have been the 
decline in New Zealand's historically high rates of political participation 
and "a loosening of the psychological and social ties between individuals 
and parties." A similar point is made by James255 who argues that while 
support for MMP may have been motivated by short term protest. it was a 
"natural next step" in the process of dealignment which New Zealand had 
been experiencing. There is certainly growing evidence to support the claim 
of Vowles and others256 of loosening psychological and social ties to the 
major political parties. 
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Figure 4 Party Identification in New Zealand, 
1981-1993 
Using data from Levine and Roberts257 we can trace party 
identification from 1981 to 1996. As figure 4 shows, party identification 
m Barry Gustafson '·Regeneration, rejection or realignment: cw Zealand political parties 
in the 1990s" in Gary R l lawke (ed) Changing Politics? The Electoral Referendum of 1993 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1993) 73 ; Vowles and others, above, 14. 
254 Vowles and others, above, 194. 
155 
Colin James '·Pluralism rules, OK?" (December 1997) New Zealand Books 34. 
256 Vowles and others. above, 194. 
217 
tephen Levine and Nigel S Roberts ··The Last Hurrah: The New Zealand General 
Election of 1993- What Happened and Why" in Jack Vowles and Peter Aimer (eds) Double 
Decision: The 1993 Election and Referendum in New Zealand (Department of Politics, 
Victoria University ofWellington, Wellington, 1994) 147 and Stephen Levine and Nigel S 
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was fairly steady until 1993 when there was a significant change. At the 
same time as identification for the two major parties (' major' line) slumped, 
the proportion of those who either have no identification (' none ' line) or 
identify for a party other than Labour or National (' other' line), increased. 
Combined (' not major' line), these voters made up 40 per cent of the 
electorate in 1996. These changes seem to provide evidence of an electorate 
in which partisan dealignment is , or has been, occurring. That the pattern 
continued over two elections suggests this is more than electoral volatility. 
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Figure 5 Party Identification in New Zealand, 1987-1996 
Even more compelling evidence of partisan dealignment can be 
drawn from the NZES data, shown in figure 5. Over the course of the 
NZES surveys, identification with the two major parties has fallen from 
over 80 per cent in 1987 to under 50 per cent in 1996. At this level the 
proportion of Labour and National identifiers is equal to the proportion of 
voters who identify with a party other than Labour or National or do not 
identify with any party. 
Roberts "MMP: The Decision" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics in Transition 
(Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland, 1997) Figure 2. 
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Figure 6 Strength ofldentification Among Labour and National Voters, 
1981-1996 
At the same time as the proportion of voters identifying with the 
major parties has decreased, the relative strength of identification of those 
who did identify has not changed much. Figure 6, based on data from 
Levine and Robert's, reveals a slight downward trend among those who 
declare 'very strong' identification, and a slight upward trend among those 
whose identification is ' not very strong'. This is not reflected in the NZES 
data for the last three elections. As figure 7 shows, according to NZES data, 
if the proportion of 'very strong' identifiers has not decreased , the 
proportion of ' not very strong ' identifiers has. 
78 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
90 Lab Nat 93 Lab Nat 96Lab Nat 
Source: Constructed by author from NZES 
Figure 7 Strength ofldentification Among Labour and National Voters, 
1990-1996. 
Overall the picture of the New Zealand electorate is one in which the 
major parties no longer had sufficient support to guarantee the maintenance 
of a two-party system but for the effects of the electoral system. However, 
as noted in Part V, a majoritarian electoral system has st ill seen the 
emergence of minority governments in Austra lia at the state level. Jn the 
case of South Australia it now appears that this may be a long-term 
situation . However, the difference between what has happened in the 
Austra lian states, and may well have happened in New Zealand if not for 
electoral system change, is that the major parties st ill dominate the 
legislatures. Minor party representation tends to be small. Thi s al lows 
influence on major issues, but does not a llow a role for minor parties on a ll 
legis lation as occurs in New Zealand currently. 
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